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ABSTRACT
PRESIDENTIAL PHILOSOPHIES AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: 
FROM THE LONG TELEGRAM TO THE NEW LOOK
John R. Moore 
Old Dominion University, 1995 
Director: Dr. Lorraine M. Lees
American foreign policy often undergoes alteration as 
presidential administrations change. After World War II 
President Harry S. Truman and President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
both implemented a foreign policy aimed at containing the 
Soviet Union, but the philosophical underpinnings of their 
foreign policies differed greatly. While the demands of 
partisan and international politics account for some of this 
difference, the impact on foreign policy of the two men's 
personalities deserves attention and investigation. In 
other words, how did the individual backgrounds, personal 
beliefs and world views of Truman and Eisenhower dictate 
their approach to foreign policy? The sources used in this 
study include the personal papers, biographies, and public 
statements of both men, housed in the National Archives and 
the Truman and Eisenhower Presidential Libraries.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The determination of the forces which shape a country's 
foreign policy requires the integration of the president's 
personal philosophy, background, and experience with the 
needs of the nation and its ongoing policies and 
obligations. Both President Harry S. Truman and President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower faced daunting challenges in pursuing 
the national security interests of the United States. Both 
men brought the sum of their individual philosophies, 
experiences, and beliefs to bear upon the unparalleled 
foreign policy problems of their presidencies.
This thesis examines the way in which each president 
developed and implemented foreign policy in light of his own 
personal makeup. Both Truman and Eisenhower identified the 
foreign policy interests of the United States upon entering 
office and placed a priority on serving those interests.
The priorities they set reflected the background and 
personal philosophy of each president, with each man's 
predisposition toward governmental organization, his 
preferences for strategic action, his willingness to assume 
risks, and his perception of the threat against the United 
States shaping his international policies.
1
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The thesis question can be broken down into several 
sub-questions. What foreign policy did President Truman 
receive from President Franklin D. Roosevelt? What required 
Truman to develop a policy of his own? What role did 
Truman's personal makeup play in determining this policy?
In Eisenhower's case similar sub-questions are asked and 
answered to arrive at a conclusion concerning the role that 
his personal makeup played in his foreign policy.
During World War II President Roosevelt conducted 
foreign policy in his own informal and highly personal 
manner. Roosevelt's chief objectives were to keep the 
Soviets engaged in the war, to ameliorate the harsher 
aspects of Soviet rule through increased contacts with the 
West, and to integrate the Soviet Union into a post-war 
international organization. Dr. "Win-the-War" used means 
ranging from compromise to delay to satisfy these objectives 
and to defeat the Axis Powers. By 1945 FDR's advisors 
pressed him to be less accommodating to the Soviets, but 
Roosevelt died before making any permanent changes in 
policy. Roosevelt's death also prevented any foreign policy 
discussions with his new Vice-President, Harry S. Truman. 
Indeed the two men had spoken only six times since the 
November 1944 election.1
JNT to NL Memorandum of 4 November 1953, Harry S. Truman 
Background, HST Appointments with FDR, 1935-1945, 
Prepresidential File (PPF), Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL),
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3On 12 April 1945, Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone swore 
in Harry S. Truman as President of the United States.
Truman decided to retain Roosevelt’s cabinet and to continue 
what he believed was Roosevelt's quid pro quo policy towards 
the Soviets. Truman came away from the 1945 Potsdam 
Conference, which was called in part to clear up a number of 
Soviet-American disagreements emanating from previous 
meetings, convinced that he could deal personally with 
Marshall Joseph Stalin. However, differences in the 
interpretation of wartime agreements continued while Soviet 
expansionist activities in Europe and the Middle East in 
1946 further exacerbated relations between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. By March, 1947 Truman had developed 
and implemented a national policy of containment, designed 
to resist the further spread of Soviet influence. What were 
the personal factors that caused this former haberdasher and 
Senator from Missouri with little experience in foreign 
policy to engage the Soviets in a struggle that came to be 
known as the Cold War?
Eisenhower, who became president in a more traditional 
manner, inherited the policy of containment from his 
predecessor but had to develop his own way of continuing its 
implementation. Truman saw the need to devise a foreign 
policy to contain the aggressive actions of the Soviets as 
demonstrated in Turkey, Iran, and Greece; Eisenhower was
Independence, Missouri.
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4equally concerned about Soviet intentions and recognized 
that he had to continue the implementation of Truman's 
policy. However, he also had to safeguard the nation's 
security in a way consistent with the partisan rhetoric of 
the recent presidential campaign, his own concerns about the 
United States' economy, and his promise to end the Korean 
War. What were the personal factors and beliefs that 
influenced this former five-star general in the continued 
development and implementation of the policy of containment 
during his administration?
The answer to the question of the personal factors, 
beliefs, and motivations Presidents Truman and Eisenhower 
brought to bear on the problem of developing foreign policy 
can be found by consulting their personal writings, speeches 
and documents before and during their terms in office. This 
study's examination of the public and private papers of 
President Truman will illuminate the philosophy that led him 
to implement his foreign policy. Such sources, for example, 
demonstrate that Truman's simplistic and limited worldview 
led him to believe that Stalin would honor his wartime 
agreements. Truman became angry when Stalin did not behave 
as other politicians in his experience had.
In a similar manner the writings and the public papers 
of President Eisenhower provide insights into the 
development and implementation of his administration's 
foreign policy, the New Look. On a personal level his
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
correspondence with a life-long friend, Everett (Swede) 
Hazlett, revealed Eisenhower's thoughts, motivations, and 
general mindset towards the events that took place from 1941 
to 1958. Both public and private documents shed light on 
Eisenhower's fiscal conservatism and its connection with the 
development of the policy of massive retaliation and the 
restraints placed on military budgets during his 
administration.
How each president approached the foreign policy
problems of his administration is a topic which has received
little attention by historians, particularly those of the
Truman and Eisenhower administrations. In a recent study of
the Truman Presidency Richard Kirkendall wrote that a better
understanding of Truman's pre-presidential development was
needed, while Alonzo Hamby lamented that few historians had
investigated the first sixty-one years of Truman's life.2
Richard Immerman in his article "Confessions of an
Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal" noted that
a critical unanswered question of the Eisenhower 
literature is whether policy responded to perceived 
threats and changes in the international environment, or 
whether it was largely generated internally by the 
actors' previously established agendas and
2Alonzo L. Hamby, "The Mind and Character of Harry S. 
Truman," in The Truman Presidency, ed. Michael J. Lacey, 
(New York: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 
and Cambridge University Press, 1991), 19.
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preconceptions.3
Immerman describes his critical question in terms of 
predispositions, core values, and belief systems. These 
considerations influenced how each president behaved in a 
given situation. Truman entered the presidency as the 
reluctant successor to President Roosevelt. Truman's 
background as a county administrative judge in rural 
Missouri and as a senator from the same state gave him a 
different outlook and parochial view of the world as 
contrasted with that of the widely travelled Eisenhower.
Eisenhower entered the White House with a highly 
developed view of the world. His assignments as supreme 
commander in Europe, Army Chief of Staff, president of 
Columbia University and supreme allied commander of NATO's 
forces influenced his outlook and contributed to his 
perception of the world and its threats.
Both presidents encountered the same problem: how to 
implement a foreign policy that was consistent with their 
previous positions and appropriate for the current 
circumstances. Each president solved the problem through 
the application of his personal beliefs and philosophy. How 
each proceeded is the subject of this study.
3Richard Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower 
Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 
14 (Summer 1990): 323.
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE SURVEY
American foreign policy, diplomatic history and 
presidential administrations have been the subject of 
extensive research and writing by historians. This is 
particularly true of the years after World War II, the 
period known as the Cold War. In recent years declassified 
information from government archives has shed more and more 
light on the development and execution of foreign policy.
Scholarly writing on the Cold War has gone through 
three distinct phases - the orthodox, revisionist and post­
revisionist schools of thought. Most of the writing has 
centered about the question of how the Cold War began and 
the role played by the presidential administrations during 
it.
The orthodox phase contains most of the historical 
works written between the late 1940s and the mid-1960s on 
the Cold War. The orthodox historians generally hold the 
Soviet Union responsible for the Cold War and the breakdown 
of Soviet-Allied cooperation which caused it. Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr., in "Origins of the Cold War," described 
the Cold War as the "brave and essential response of free
7
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8men to Communist aggression.111 Herbert Feis's From Trust 
to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War. 1945-1950 (1970), 
Walter W. Rostow's The United States In the World Arena: An 
Essay In Recent History (1960), George Kennan's American 
Diplomacy. 1900-1951 (1951), and Hans Morgenthau’s In 
Defense of the National Interest (1951), to name a few, also 
represent the orthodox position. John W. Spanier provides 
perhaps the best insight into the orthodox interpretation of 
these years in his American Foreign Policy Since World War 
II (1973).2
Vietnam marked a watershed in American life which also 
had its impact upon historical writing. The revisionists 
who wrote primarily during this period saw the United States 
as responsible for the way the Cold War developed and in 
some cases, even responsible for the Cold War itself. As 
scholars of the "New Left" began to write of the Truman- 
Eisenhower years, the revisionist school of historians 
challenged the orthodox historians and held that the Cold
’Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Origins of the Cold War," 
Foreign Affairs 46 (October 1967): 22-52.
2Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the 
Cold War. 1945-1950 (New York: Norton, 1970); Walter W. 
Rostow, The United States In The World Arena: An Essay in 
Recent History (New York: Harper, 1960); George Kennan, 
American Diplomacy 1900-1951 (New York: Mentor, 1951); Hans 
Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1952); and John W. Spanier, American 
Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York: Praeger, 1973).
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9War was an outgrowth of American capitalism.3 The 
historian most associated with the "New Left's" theme of 
revisionism was William A. Williams. In his book, Tragedy of 
American Diplomacy (1959) Williams argued that "the tragedy 
of American diplomacy . . .  is that it denies and subverts 
American ideas and ideals." Williams went on to blame "open 
door expansion" for the failure of American diplomacy.4
Williams wrote that the United States could have 
avoided the Cold War if it had been more sympathetic to the 
fears and concerns of the Soviet Union. These concerns 
reflected the basic insecurities of the Soviet Union for a 
secure western frontier backed up by a guarantee against a 
resurgent Germany, and a need for assistance in economic 
recovery. The desire of the American government to maintain 
its Open Door Policy in Eastern and Western Europe 
threatened the Soviet Union's goals. The Truman 
Administration's subsequent use of "atomic diplomacy" and 
economic coercion were prime examples of the emerging 
American threat to Soviet security.
In 1961, D.F. Fleming published a two-volume study 
which provided the detail to substantiate Williams' seminal 
work. In The Cold War and Its Origins (1961) Fleming
3Joseph Siracusa, The New Left Diplomatic Histories and 
Historians: The American Revisionists (Claremont, CA: Regina 
Books, 1993), 101-15.
4William A. Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy 
(New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1959), 292.
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contended that Truman's temperament and personal animosity 
against the Soviet Union led him to adopt the hard-line put 
forward by advisors such as W. Averell Harriman and Dean 
Acheson. This started with economic coercion when Truman 
cut off Lend-Lease at the end of the war and continued with 
his general reversal of Roosevelt's policies toward the 
Soviet Union after less than two years in office.5
In 1965 another revisionist work appeared: Free World 
Colossus: A Critique of American Foreign Policy in the Cold 
War by David Horowitz. Later revised in 1971 at the height 
of protest against American involvement in the war in Viet 
Nam, this book was a condensed version of Fleming's work, 
but levied even harsher charges against Truman and his 
advisors. Horowitz argued that the United States sought to 
maintain political oligarchies and military elites in power 
and to limit democracy outside the United States. Another 
study, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam. The Use of 
the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation With Soviet 
Power (1967) by Gar Alperovitz accused Truman of using the 
atomic bomb to bully the Soviets after economic coercion 
didn't alter their behavior. Alperovitz agreed with 
Fleming's thesis that Truman's reversal of Roosevelt's
5D.F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins. 1917-1960 
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961).
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policies began the Cold War.6
As opposition to the war in Vietnam grew, more 
historians became receptive to revisionist themes. Racial 
unrest, poverty, civil rights, intervention in Cuba and 
opposition to the war shattered the foreign policy consensus 
of the fifties and caused the intellectual community to 
revise its assumptions about American virtue. Other works, 
such as Gabriel Kolko's Politics of War: The World and 
United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945 (1968); Diane Shaver 
Clemens' Yalta (1970); and Lloyd C. Gardner's Architects of 
Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy. 1941- 
1949 (1970) echoed Fleming's theme. Kolko stressed the 
needs of the American economic system, while Clemens 
emphasized individual personalities rather than economic 
requirements. Clemens also rejected Fleming's theory that 
Roosevelt's policies were suddenly reversed by Truman, 
arguing that Truman's policies were the logical conclusion 
of Roosevelt's attempt to alter Soviet behavior. Gardner 
saw Eastern Europe as the cause of conflict over other 
spheres of influence; it was particularly in Eastern Europe 
that the Open Door Policy brought the United States into
6David Horowitz, Free World Colossus: A Critique of
American Foreign Policy In The Cold War (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1965); and Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima 
and Potsdam. The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American 
Confrontation with Soviet Power (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1967).
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conflict with the security needs of the Soviet Union.7
In 1975 Daniel Bell wrote "The End of American 
Exceptionalism" in which he described how belief in American 
exceptionalism "had vanished with the end of empire, the 
weakening of power, the loss of faith in the nation's 
future."8 Bell specifically claimed that American 
exceptionalism, embodied in the idea of the American 
Century, "foundered on the shoals of Vietnam."9
Since the 1970s and early 1980s, historical writing has 
reflected a mid-point between the orthodox and revisionist 
schools. This post-revisionist school saw both the United 
States and the Soviet Union sharing responsibility for the 
Cold War. The post-revisionists stressed the careful use of 
archival materials and the importance of personalities in 
shaping post war relations. They also included 
revisionists' insights into the self-interested nature of 
United States' policies.
A critique of the revisionists' methods first emerged 
in the form of Robert J. Maddox's New Left and the Origins 
of the Cold War (1973). Maddox questioned the scholarship
7Gabriel Kolko, Politics of War: The World and United 
States Foreign Policy. 1943-1945 (New York: Random House,
1968); Diane Shaver Clemens, Yalta (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1970); and Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects of 
Illusion: Men and Ideas In American Foreign Policy. 1941- 
1949 (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970).
8Daniel Bell, "The End of American Exceptionalism," The 
Public Interest 11 (Fall 1975): 197.
9Ibid., 204.
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of the revisionists, claiming that they quoted out of 
context, joined disparate quotes, and altered the meanings 
of sentences through abbreviation. The revisionists greeted 
The New Left with disdain, but could not ignore Maddox's 
work.10
The most damaging rebuttal to the revisionists1 theme 
of American perfidy and economic determinism has come with 
the increasing availability of new primary sources. As 
early as June 1969, George C. Herring, Jr., writing in the 
Journal of American. History, disputed the revisionist1s 
theory that Truman canceled Lend-Lease in a deliberate 
attempt to coerce Stalin.11 In 1978 Wilson D. Miscamble 
wrote in Diplomatic History that Truman's sudden reversal of 
Roosevelt's policy grew out of a conversation with British 
Prime Minister Anthony Eden on 23 April 1945.12 Eden 
convinced the less experienced Truman that blunt talk was 
needed when dealing with the Soviets.
Other authors have disputed the revisionist's theme in 
detail after detail. In 1983 John Lewis Gaddis, by now the 
dean of the so-called post-revisionist school, argued that
10Robert J. Maddox, The New Left and the Origins of the 
Cold War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973).
“George C. Herring, Jr. "Lend Lease to Russia and The 
Origins of the Cold War," Journal of American History 56 (June
1969): 93-114.
“Wilson D. Miscamble, "Anthony Eden and the Truman- 
Molotov Conversations, April 1945," Diplomatic History 2 
(Spring 1978): 179.
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there was no basis to the principal tenets of the 
revisionists.13 Post-war American foreign policy did not 
resemble the Leninist theory of imperialism which the 
revisionists claimed. United States' foreign policy was not 
based on the search for new wealth abroad which the American 
capitalist system needed for its survival. In addition 
Gaddis used Vojtech Mastny's Russia's Road to the Cold War 
(1979) to show that Stalin pursued his policies without 
regard for American sensibilities.14
Writing in Diplomatic History. Gaddis provided an 
excellent description of the elements of a new consensus 
emerging from the traditionalist and revisionist accounts in 
his article, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the 
Origins of the Cold War."15 For Gaddis the major 
contribution of the post-revisionists to the historiography 
of the Cold war was to confirm several key arguments put 
forth by the orthodox traditionalists as well as to 
recognize the significance of the revisionists' 
contributions. For Gaddis the difference is the use of 
systematic archival research.16
13John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist 
Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," Diplomatic 
History 7 (Summer 1983): 172-73.
14 Vo j tech Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1979).
15Ibid., 172-190.
16Ibid., 180.
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More recently writers have gone beyond the 
revisionists' theories while retaining some aspects of 
revisionism. This synthesis is due partly to the passage of 
time, but also to the availability of additional materials. 
Among others, Gaddis himself acknowledges the role of 
economic pressure in American foreign policy, but notes that 
economic policy supported political goals. He also joins 
the revisionists in questioning the intention of the Soviet 
Union to achieve world-wide dominance, but points out that 
earlier revisionist accounts failed to perceive that 
Stalin's defensive goals posed security problems for the 
West.17
The most recent collection of the views of both 
revisionists and post-revisionists is The End of the Cold 
War: Its Meaning and Implications (1992) edited by Michael 
J.Hogan. This work, which revisits most of the arguments 
about the Cold War, also includes interesting speculation 
about the future of the world after the end of the Cold War. 
However, even with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the 
end of the Cold War, some revisionists still persist in 
their view of the United States as the evil genius of the 
Cold War.18 A 1994 article by Gar Alperovitz and Kai Bird 
demonstrates this view. In "The Centrality of the Bomb,"
17Ibid., 181.
18Michael, J. Hogan, ed., The End of the Cold War 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
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they argue that possession of the bomb was the chief enabler 
of Truman's postwar strategy.19
Included in Hogan's collection of twenty-two essays are 
those by Bruce Cumings, Ronald Steel and Noam Chomsky. For 
these writers the Soviet Union was always a second-rate 
power eventually destined to fall due to internal causes.
The United States had magnified the Soviet threat out of 
proportion in an effort to dominate the Third World. In a 
similar vein Samuel F. Wells, Jr. argues that President 
Reagan's defense build-up finally made the Soviets recognize 
the failure of their economic system and their inability to 
compete with the United States in the production of modern 
military systems such as the Strategic Defense 
Initiative.20
A reviewer of Hogan's book, Robert A. Divine, wrote in 
September 1993 that the end of the Cold War was leading to 
the same division among scholars as its origins had.21 
Divine closes with the comment that "if the end of the Cold 
War is bad news for the American economy, it may well prove 
to be a godsend for historians, or at least those willing to 
master the Cyrillic alphabet."22
19Gar Alperovitz and Kai Bird, "The Centrality of the 
Bomb," Foreign Policy 94 (Spring 94): 4.
20Hogan, The End of the Cold War, 5.
21Robert A. Divine, "The Cold War as History," Reviews 
In American History 22 (September 1993): 527.
22Ibid., 532.
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American foreign relations in general have also been 
the subject of orthodox (i.e. nationalist), revisionist and 
post revisionist writers. After World War I, historians 
such as Samuel Flagg Bemis and Dexter Perkins described 
United States' diplomacy in the orthodox terms of the growth 
of power and the creation of a series of principles such as 
the Monroe Doctrine. Progressive historians such as Charles 
Beard challenged this nationalist perspective and sought to 
discover the intellectual assumptions that governed policy 
makers and diplomats. Where the nationalists stressed 
continuity in diplomatic history, the progressive historians 
saw change as the major feature of American foreign 
relations.
A few years later, realists such as George Kennan and 
Hans J. Morgenthau began to question the ability of foreign 
policy makers to control an increasingly complex and 
dangerous international system. Pessimism and a critical 
approach became the hallmarks of the realists who minimized 
the influence of public opinion and domestic politics on 
diplomacy and saw the need for policy making by professional 
elites. The revisionists, as previously noted, concentrated 
on the motives behind American diplomacy. Postrevisionists 
such as John Lewis Gaddis redirected attention to the state 
and its governing elites as the principal foci of foreign 
relations. Combining elements of the revisionists' approach 
and the criticism of the realists, the postrevisionists see
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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foreign relations driven by the geopolitical concerns of the 
elite, not by domestic pressures.
On the other hand, the 1983 book by Hugh Thomas, Armed 
Truce: The Beginning of the Cold War 1945-1946 (1987) 
incorporates evidence from Nikita Khrushchev, Svetlana 
Alliluyeve, and others to the effect that the Soviet Union 
aspired to world influence, if not hegemony.23 The cause 
of the Cold War for Thomas was the communist ideology which 
held that conflict between communist and capitalist worlds 
was inevitable.
Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson have assembled 
an overview of the current state of scholarship on the 
history of American foreign relations in their joint work, 
Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations (1991) 
which centers on the "fracturing of the Cold War 
consensus.1,24 This collection of essays illustrates the 
current approaches to the study of American foreign 
relations. For instance, Thomas J. McCormick describes the 
world systems approach, while Louis A Perez, Jr., outlines 
the dependency theory to describe the relationship between 
the United States and Latin America. The theory of 
bureaucratic politics by J. Garry Clifford follows the
23Hugh Thomas, Armed Truce: The Beginnings of the Cold 
War. 1945-1946 (New York: Atheneum, 1987).
24Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., 
Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 7.
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balance of power approach by Stephen Pelz. Richard H. 
Immerman's essay explores the relationship between 
psychology and the history of foreign relations, while Alan 
K. Henrikson outlines the mental maps or frameworks used by 
diplomats to orient themselves in the world. Melvin Small 
writes of the role of public opinion in the development of 
diplomatic and military strategy in the United States as an 
approach to the study of foreign relations. Michael Hunt 
describes the notion of ideology to make historians focus on 
the cultural values and privilege that shape the 
consciousness of policymakers. Melvyn P. Leffler provides 
the national security approach while Hogan himself 
illustrates how the corporatist analysis deals with the 
political pressures, bureaucratic rivalries and geopolitical 
strategy of diplomacy.
Of the approaches offered by Hogan and Paterson, Melvyn 
Leffler's use of the concept of national security seems the 
most balanced in its considerations of motives, perceptions 
and the use of national power. In his essay "National 
Security," Leffler borrows a definition of national security 
from a 1966 article: "national security encompasses the 
decisions and actions deemed imperative to protect domestic 
core values from external threats".25 Leffler sees 
national security as the synthesis of the realist and
25P.G. Bock and Morton Berkowitz, "The Emerging Field 
of National Security," World Politics 19 (October 1966): 
122-36.
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revisionist approaches which integrates questions of 
political economy/ military policy, and defense strategy.26 
For Leffler this approach assumes that foreign threats 
result from both real dangers in the external environment as 
well as ideological precepts, cultural images and mistaken 
perceptions.27 Leffler elaborated on his approach in his 
seminal work, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, 
the Truman Administration, and the Cold War. Leffler argues 
that Truman and his advisors sought a "preponderance of 
power" because of fears and uncertainties about the postwar 
world. Results were mixed; mistakes were made out of 
concerns about the correlations of power which far 
outweighed concerns over the economy of the United 
States.28
Akira Iriye had previously described the intercultural 
relations approach in his 1979 article, "Culture and Power: 
International Relations as Intercultural Relations," noting 
"the relationship between a country's cultural system and 
its behavior in the international system were the most
26Melvyn P. Leffler, "National Security," in Hogan and 
Patterson, Explaining the History of Foreign Relations. 203.
27Ibid.
28Idem, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, 
the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1992), 15-16.
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interesting and fruitful fields of investigation.1,29 By 
comparison Howard Jones and Randall B. Woods in their 
article "Origins of the Cold War In Europe and the Near 
East: Recent Historiography and the National Security 
Imperative"30 suggest that the national security imperative 
represents a synthesis and perhaps a dominant approach to 
the Cold War. For Jones and Woods, the national security 
imperative integrates the effect of both the domestic and 
the international forces behind American diplomacy.
The fourth volume of the Cambridge History of American 
Foreign Relations describes the United States and the Soviet 
Union from 1945 to 1991. The editor, Warren I. Cohen, also 
sees the security dilemma as the cause of the Cold War, as 
the Soviets responded to security actions by the United 
States which the Soviets perceived as threatening. The 
Soviets also had problems understanding and judging 
responses to their actions by the United States. Cohen 
especially sees the Korean War as Stalin's "most disastrous 
Cold War gamble as it would intensify a confrontation that 
continued for forty years at enormous cost to the major
29Akira Iriye, "Culture and Power: International 
Relations As Intercultural Relations," Diplomatic History 3 
(Spring 1979), 116.
30Howard Jones and Randall B. Woods, "Origins of the 
Cold War in Europe and the Near East: Recent Historiography 
and the National Security Imperative," Diplomatic History 17 
(Spring 1993): 251.
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antagonists and the rest of the world."31 In his 
conclusion Cohen writes that Soviet suspicion of the United 
States' intentions combined with knowledge of the 
superiority of its weapons and remembrance of Western 
hostility to the Soviet state drove the Soviets to take 
steps to increase their security. These steps in turn 
affected strategic thinking in the United States which was 
reflected in its rearmament program.32 That the ensuing 
competition became hostile and evolved into the Cold War was 
due to the nature of the Soviet regime - "a powerful and 
vicious dictatorship, a ruthless totalitarian state."33
Just as American foreign policy has been the subject of 
different views and opinions, historical scholars and other 
writers have examined and studied Presidents Truman and 
Eisenhower. Truman does not seem to have been as 
controversial a subject for revisionist scholars: they cite 
him as the cause of the Cold War. Most of the newer studies 
of the Truman Administration demonstrate that the 
administration sought to spread American economic and 
political principles overseas but question whether the
31 Warren I. Cohen, ed., America in the Age of Soviet 
Power, 1945-1991. vol 4, The Cambridge History of American 
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motive was "national self-aggrandizement and whether 
America's postwar search for security left no room for 
Soviet security."34
On the other hand, historical writers in Eisenhower's 
case initially questioned his skill as a president and saw 
him as one who accomplished little during his 
administration. In the 1980s, a new revisionist image of 
Eisenhower emphasized his skill in dealing with the 
Congress, in ending the Korean War and avoiding other 
conflicts, and in balancing defense needs against the 
necessity of maintaining a limit on military spending. The 
post revisionists do, however, fault Eisenhower for the 
failure of most United States' activities in the Third 
World.
Positive biographies of President Truman include his 
own two-volume autobiography, Memoirs (1955). Robert H. 
Ferrell, the dean of Truman scholars, wrote The 
Autobiography of Harry S . Truman (1980) from Truman's own 
sketches about himself, Off The Record: The Private Papers 
of Harry S Truman (1980), Dear Bess: The Letters from Harry 
to Bess Truman. 1910-1959 (1983), and Harry S. Truman: A 
Life (1994). Another Truman scholar, Robert J. Donovan, has 
also written a two-volume study of the Truman Presidency, 
Crisis and Conflict (1977) and The Tumultuous Years (1982). 
Trumari's daughter, Margaret, wrote about her father in Harry
34Jones and Woods, "Origins of the Cold War," 255.
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S. Truman (1973).35
Other works on the Truman Presidency include the not 
impartial The Man of Independence (1950) by Jonathan 
Daniels, the insightful Truman (1986) by Roy Jenkins, John 
Hersey's detailed Aspects of the Presidency (1980), and 
Cabell Phillips' firsthand observations as a reporter in The 
Truman Presidency. The History of a Triumphant Succession 
(1966). Merle Miller compiled the reminiscences of the 
elderly president in Plain Speaking (1974). David 
McCullough's Truman (1992) is the latest full-scale 
biography which presents a positive assessment of the 
president.36
Historical writing about the Eisenhower Presidency has 
changed more over the years. As previously noted, scholars 
initially questioned his ability as president and came to
36Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Year of Decisions (Garden 
City, NY: Doubleday, 1955); Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years 
of Trial and Hope (New York: Doubleday, 1965); Robert H. 
Ferrell, ed., The Autobiography of Harry S. Truman (Boulder, 
CO: Associated University Press, 1980); Robert H. Ferrell, 
ed., Off The Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1980); Robert H. Ferrell, ed., 
Dear Bess: The Letters from Harry to Bess Truman. 1910-1959 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1983); and Robert H. Ferrell, Harry
S. Truman: A Life (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri 
Press, 1984).
36Jonathan Daniels, The Man of Independence 
(Philadelphia: Lippencott, 1950); Roy Jenkins, Truman (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1986); John Hersey, Aspects of the 
Presidency (New Haven and New York: Ticknor and Fields, 
1980); Cabel Phillips, The Truman Presidency, The History of 
a Triumphant Succession (New York: Macmillan, 1966); Merle 
Miller, Plain Speaking (New York: Berkeley, 1974); and David 
McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992).
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the conclusion that he was beyond his depth in the 
presidency. In the 1970s revisionist scholars, such as Elmo 
Richardson who published The Presidency of Dwight D. 
Eisenhower in 1979, challenged this conclusion. Other 
important revisionist works include Harbet Parmet's 
Eisenhower and the American Crusades (1972), Blanche Cook’s 
Dwight David Eisenhower: Antimilitarist in the White House 
(1974); Peter Lyon's Eisenhower: Portrait of the Hero
(1974); Charles Alexander's Holding the Line: the Eisenhower 
Era. 1952-1961 (1975); and Gary Reichard’s The Reaffirmation 
of Republicanism: Eisenhower and the Eightv-Third Congress
(1975).37
Biographical works include Eisenhower's own Mandate for 
Change. 1953-1956 (1963) and Waging Peace. 1956-1961 (1965). 
Ike's Letters To A Friend (1984) contain his views on a 
variety of topics. Complementary biographies include 
Stephen Ambrose's two-volumes, Soldier, General of the Army. 
President-Elect 1890-1952 (1983) and The President (1984); 
Parmet's Eisenhower and the American Crusades (1972), R.
37Elmo Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D.
Eisenhower (Lawrence, KS: The Regents Press of Kansas,
1979); Herbert Parmet, Eisenhower and the American Crusades 
(New York: Macmillan, 1972); Blanche Cook, Dwight David 
Eisenhower: Antimilitarist in the White House (St. Charles, 
MO: Forums In History, 1974; Peter Lyon, Eisenhower:
Portrait of the Hero (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974); Charles 
Alexander, Holding the Line: The Eisenhower Era. 1952-1961 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1975); and Gary 
Reichard, The Reaffirmation of Republicanism: Eisenhower and 
the Eightv-Third Congress (Knoxville, TN: University of 
Tennessee Press, 1975).
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Alton Lee's Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier and Statesman
(1981); and Peter Lyon's critical Eisenhower: Portrait of 
the Hero (1974).38
The most valuable primary source on both Truman and 
Eisenhower is the U.S. Department of State' series. Foreign 
Relations of the United States. Another exceptional series 
is the Public Papers of The Presidents. The final 
authority on each president is of course the materials in 
his presidential library.
The social upheaval engendered by the Viet Nam War and 
the changing nature of the inquiry into American history 
have influenced historical writing about the Cold War, the 
conduct of foreign relations and the presidencies of Truman 
and Eisenhower. As time passes the method of inquiry 
becomes broader and more encompassing. The recent emphasis 
on the national security imperative provides a glimpse of 
its ability to tie together the many factors involved in a
i!!Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate 
for Change. 1953-1956 (Garden city, NY: Doubleday, 1963; 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace. 
1956-1961 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965); Robert W. 
Griffith, ed., Ike's Letters To A Friend, 1941-1958 
(Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1984); Stephen 
Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier. General of the Army, 
President-Elect 1890-1952 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1983); Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower. The President (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); Herbert Parmet, Eisenhower 
and the American Crusades (New York: Macmillan, 1972); R. 
Alton Lee, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier and Statesman 
(Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1981); and Peter Lyon, Eisenhower: 
Portrait of the Hero (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974).
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study of American foreign relations.
The subsequent sections of this thesis will build upon 
this literature and will answer the question: What did each 
president bring to his presidency and its foreign relations?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 3 
HARRY S. TRUMAN
In March 1941 Harry S. Truman became Chairman of the 
Senate Special Committee to Investigate the Defense Program. 
He was fifty-seven years old and little known outside 
Washington, D.C. and the state of Missouri. He was first 
elected to the Senate in 1934, but had not noticeably 
distinguished himself during his first term. He had, 
however, made inroads among the established members of the 
Senate and had won high marks in spite of his connections to 
the infamous Pendergast machine of Kansas City. He was 
popular with his fellow senators and became a first-rate 
committee chairman.1 In a little more than thirty-six 
months Harry Truman became President of the United States 
and brought the nation into the unknown territory of World 
War II's aftermath.
President Truman frequently acknowledged his lack of 
preparation for his new position, but he is as frequently 
acknowledged as one of the best of the modern presidents. 
What did this former haberdasher from Missouri bring to his 
duties and the "the hardest job in the world" that made him
Donald H. Riddle, The Truman Committee: A Study in 
Congressional Responsibility (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers 
University Press, 1964), 16-17.
28
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29
as successful as he was? What ideological baggage did Harry 
S. Truman bring to the White House when he was sworn in as 
President on 12 April 1945? As the historian Richard 
Kirkendall wrote: "We need a better understanding of his
pre-presidential development."2
This chapter will describe the pre-dispositions that 
Harry Truman brought with him to the White House. It will 
demonstrate that Truman had already established himself as 
an internationalist and that he was well-versed in domestic 
politics at the national level. While Truman had little 
opportunity to meet with President Roosevelt before his 
death, Truman had his own ideas about foreign policy and 
relations with other nations after the war.
Dean Acheson commented that he thought Truman had 
experienced "the presidency in miniature" during his tenure 
as a country administrator with foreign affairs reduced to 
dealing with the sovereign state of Missouri. Truman 
learned how complicated it was to run government and also 
gained an understanding of the difficulties of 
administration. He understood the frustrations of the 
governmental process in which democracy dilutes the elements 
of command and authority. He had training in decisiveness
2William F. Levantrosser, ed., Harry S. Truman: The Man 
from Independence (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 25.
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and did not, as General Marshall had said, "fight the 
problem." He solved it.3
As Chairman of the Senate investigating committee, 
Truman honed the political skills he would later use as 
President in dealing with foreign leaders. He preferred to 
use quiet persuasion rather than public confrontation to 
induce contractors and government agencies to correct abuses 
uncovered by his committee's investigations. When 
persuasion failed, Truman "got tough."4
No aspect of Truman's attitude and experience was more 
defining of his approach to foreign affairs than his 
intuitive grasp of the political center. Just as he 
disdained the extremism of the left and the right in 
American politics, he did not distinguish between the 
totalitarianism of the left and the right in foreign 
affairs, an attitude which was deeply rooted in his own 
Midwestern background.5 He believed in America's mission
3David S. McLellan and David C. Acheson, eds., Among 
Friends: Personal Letters of Dean Acheson (New York: Dodd, 
Mead and Company, 1980), 329.
4Deborah Welch Larson, "Belief and Inference: The 
Origins of American Leaders' Cold War Ideology" (Ph.D. 
diss., Stanford University, 1983), 205.
sAlonzo L. Hamby, Liberalism and Its Challengers: FDR 
to Reagan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 71.
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in the world and held a conviction that totalitarianism of
the Left was as menacing as that of the Right.6
Background
Harry Truman was one of the last presidents born in the 
nineteenth century, but he was a product of the great 
tensions of the early twentieth century. His public life 
was shaped by the increasing gulf between the urban and the 
rural and the growing conflict between the small-town 
America of shops and farms and the modern United States of
cities and large corporations.7
Truman's family was fervently attached to the 
Democratic Party. Its tenets were even more deeply 
instilled in him than his Baptist heritage.9 The life of 
his grandfather, Solomon Young, provided an example and a 
definition of personal advancement: economic success was the 
product of a solitary entrepreneur who risked a small stake, 
worked hard and eventually prospered.9 His father defined 
masculinity for Harry as a simple, rough-and-ready
6Alonzo L. Hamby, "The Mind and Character of Harry S. 
Truman" in The Truman Presidency, ed. Michael J. Lacey,
(New York: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 
and Cambridge University Press, 1991), 52.
7Robert Griffith, "Forging America's Postwar Order: 
Domestic Politics and Political Economy in the Age of 
Truman," Lacey, 85.
8Lacey, The Truman Presidency, 22.
9Ibid., 21.
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willingness to speak bluntly and be ready to fight. He 
passed along to Harry a reputation for honesty and the 
family way to prosper: taking big risks with small stakes in 
the hope of big gains.10 His mother gave Harry a set of 
values and characteristics that reinforced those of his 
father, those of the honest, hard-working, plain-speaking 
rural culture of the Midwest.11
Like most Americans of his time, Truman was caught up 
in the tensions of a nation emerging onto the world scene. 
Truman's early years mirror the triumph of American 
nationalism, the decline of rural life and influence, and 
the rise of a dominant urban culture. He was a firm 
believer in progress and quickly outgrew the small village 
of his youth. He embraced the metropolis of Kansas City, 
but retained his small town roots. He aligned himself with 
the forces of modernization - the Farm Bureau, the good 
roads movement, and the advocates of planning and efficiency 
in government. He also carried a life-long resentment 
against the large and powerful financial interests and their 
captive politicians who had kept him from the American dream 
of fame and wealth because of his failed businesses.12
10Ibid., 23.
"Ibid., 23.
"Robert Griffith, "Harry S Truman and the Burden of 
Modernity," Reviews in American History 9 (September 1981): 
303.
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Truman's early life as a businessman, civic leader, and 
county administrator made him a "entrepreneurial liberal." 
His was the classic experience of the small-town, country 
businessman, suspicious of big business and its accompanying 
financial establishment; hopeful of rapid economic growth 
and development, looking at times to the federal government 
for help, but resentful of bureaucratic rules and 
regulations. His future economic policies would reflect 
this experience.13
Truman's life was shaped by politics. He grew up in a 
time when politics was still linked to the rural networks of 
family and friends. Loyalty and friendship were the most 
important values in this highly personalized culture. 
However, Truman's faith in efficiency and organization and 
the rush of national and world events pushed him into a new 
and different world of bureaucratic politics.14 Truman was 
also a business manager who saw ordinary partisan politics 
as a regrettable necessity at the local level. To the 
greatest extent possible, he sought a reputation as a tight- 
fisted budget manager, not as a dispenser of favors and 
social benefits.15
13Hamby, Liberalism and Its Challengers. 63.
“Griffith, "HST and the Burden of Modernity," 305.
“Alonzo L. Hamby, "Harry S. Truman: Insecurity and 
Responsibility," in Fred I. Greenstein, ed., Leadership In 
the Modern Presidency (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1988), 50.
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Harry Truman grew up in a society that venerated 
masculine strength and leadership. As a boy, he revered 
Andrew Jackson as one of his heroes. Throughout his life he 
admired strong presidents. His reading of the Constitution 
reinforced his belief that the presidency was a position of 
power. The example of FDR underscored these lessons and 
left him determined to defend his office against all 
encroachments, just as he had defended his county's fiscal 
responsibility against the spoils system of local 
politics.16
Truman believed firmly in the American form of 
government set up under the Constitution with its separation 
of powers among the executive, legislative and judicial 
branches of the federal government and its division of 
powers between the central government and the states. He 
did not want to encroach on the powers of the other federal 
branches and, as a border state politician, did not want to 
interfere with states' rights. He respected the presidency, 
but did not make it imperial.
On economic questions Truman supported free enterprise, 
free trade, personal freedom to chose one's own career, and 
a minimum of governmental regulation. Economic abuses 
justified corrective legislation, but not interference with 
individual initiative. He believed in a balanced budget and 
fiscal responsibility. He preferred to meet economic
16Ibid., 60.
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problems by stimulating the growth of industry. Consistency 
did not bother him when sometimes his conservative views 
conflicted with his Fair Deal programs; he tried to meet 
each problem as it came.17 Although he was an ardent and 
partisan Democrat in politics, he was in many ways 
indistinguishable from the petit bourgeois Republican whom 
Sinclair Lewis satirized as George F. Babbitt. Like 
Babbitt, Truman was a small businessman who espoused the 
idea that business methods were applicable to government.18
Harry Truman believed that one of the reasons for the 
increased cost of local government was the increased demand 
for public services at the expense of the public treasury. 
Too much was being asked of the state. "The tendency is 
toward rather socialistic and paternalistic things. . . .
Let people go back to working for themselves and supporting 
their dependents, rather than expect the state to do it."19 
He believed that it was the nature of governments to expand 
and wanted to consolidate departments that did the same work 
and to place the government on an "economic way to make
“Harold F. Gosnell, Truman's Crises: A Political 
Biography of Harry S. Truman (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 
Press, 1980), 555.
18Greenstein, Leadership in the Modern Presidency. 50.
“Harry S. Truman's Address to the Club Presidents 
Round Table, Spring 1931, Personal Correspondence: Harry S. 
Truman-County Judge, Box 1, Lou E. Holland Papers, HSTL.
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government and public service efficient."20 Truman, 
however, believed in using the power of the government to 
advance social causes and human rights.
Truman's experience in Jackson County had convinced him 
that public contractors were not good spenders of public 
funds unless they were watched. He remembered too that 
after World War I nineteen separate committees had been set 
up to investigate how the country's money had been spent in 
the war effort. Truman captured Congress' imagination with 
the idea of a committee to do the watching during the war 
rather than after the fact. Mr Truman revealed in his 
management of this committee his political methods. He did 
not run it as a one-man show; he delegated matters to other 
members, but when it came to decisions, he made them or 
others did in accordance with his ideas.21
Government Efficiency
Early in his political career Truman developed an 
interest in the size and efficiency of government. In 1930 
while he was a Presiding Judge in Missouri, he introduced a 
bill to eliminate unnecessary duplication of service and 
division of authority. Later during his term as Presiding
20Harry S Truman's Address to the Real Estate Board of 
Kansas City, 25 September 1931, Personal Correspondence: 
Harry S. Truman-County Judge, Box 1, Holland Papers, HSTL.
21 Luther Huston, "Truman's Record Shows Practical, 
Prudent Man" New York Times. 15 April 1945, 4b.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
37
Judge, Truman turned more and more to centralization, an 
experience that would serve him well as a New Deal senator 
and vice president.22 Truman was to say later that the 
federal budget involved much larger funds than that of 
Jackson County, Missouri, but that the "principles were the 
same. "23
Stemming from his investigation of the national defense 
program, Truman went on record a number of times in 
opposition to having a number of competing and conflicting 
agencies charged with similar and overlapping 
responsibilities. He proposed time and time again the 
elimination of such duplication and the concentration of 
responsibility in one administrator.24
He attributed responsibility for nearly all the 
failures and shortcomings which his Senate Committee found 
to three basic weaknesses in war programs: inadequate 
initial planning and delay in determining basic policies; 
second, conflicting authority over and responsibility for 
various war programs resulting in delays and the avoidance 
of responsibility; and third, hesitancy to adopt unpopular
22Eugene F. Schmidtlein. "Truman the Senator" (Ph.D. 
diss., University of Missouri, 1962), 44.
23Ibid., 124.
24Resume of Information and Statements Which May 
Indicate or Suggest Possible Policies of President Truman, 
n.d., 77, Biographical File, President's Secretary's Files
(PSF), Harry S Truman Papers, HSTL. (Hereafter cited as 
Resume with page number.)
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or unpleasant policies long after the facts clearly showed 
such policies were necessary. He saw a need for clearly 
defined centralized authority, exercised by a few officials, 
each solely responsible for the administration of certain 
activities. These officials should meet frequently to 
eliminate all conflicts of jurisdiction and be ready to 
advise the president on important questions of policy while 
relieving him completely of purely administrative work.25
World Peace and Collaboration 
In a speech before the Women's National Democratic Club 
on 6 March 1944, Senator Truman declared that the only 
"logical basis" for a lasting peace was an improved United 
Nations, headed by Britain, China, Russia and the United 
States. Only a system of collective defense could ensure 
lasting peace.26 On another occasion he said that 
expanding trade through reciprocal arrangements could 
forestall the growth of economic dissatisfaction out of 
which grew world wars. 27
By 1944 Truman was leader of a group of senators who 
were generally in agreement on foreign and domestic policy. 
He designed the Burton, Ball, Hatch Hill (B2H2) Resolution 
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body.28 During the Democratic Convention Truman called 
upon his party to take part in world affairs after this war 
and to maintain the peace by using the armed forces, if 
necessary.29 He supported Senator Claude Pepper's 
amendment to the Connally Resolution, which aimed at 
substantially strengthening the United States' commitment to 
the establishment of a more positive form of world 
organization. Truman declared that a few willful senators 
had prevented the United States from entering the League of 
Nations in 1919. "Isolationism cannot end and will not end 
unless the Senate is willing to end it." He was sure that 
the current world war had resulted from the isolationist 
posture of the United States. He was equally sure that 
another war would follow shortly unless the United States 
and its allies worked together for peace in the same manner 
they had worked together for victory.30 Commenting on the 
1944 Democratic platform which he helped draft, Senator 
Truman stated "the United States will take part in world 
affairs this time and maintain the peace by using the Army 
and Navy, if necessary."31
28Lacey, The Truman Presidency. 35.
29Robert A. Divine Second Chance: The Triumph of 
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Foreign Relations and National Security
The new president came into office with little obvious
preparation for foreign affairs. He had made a striking
comment on relations with the Soviet Union in 1941 when
Hitler invaded Russia:
If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help 
Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help 
Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible 
although I don't want to see Hitler victorious under any 
circumstance.32
Time magazine characterized Truman as " a man of distinct 
limitations, especially in high level politics. . . . His 
knowledge of foreign affairs is limited."33 However,
Truman brought to the White House certain resources which 
helped him carry out a vigorous, assertive foreign policy: a 
knowledge of history, political skills, and a characteristic 
style of leadership.34
President Truman was not, however, a complete neophyte 
in the area of foreign relations. He brought with him to 
the White House a set of assumptions about the cause of war 
and the requirements of peace as a result of having lived 
through a tumultuous period in world politics. Dean Acheson 
recalled that Truman had experienced the nature, the 
importance and the limitations of military power and
32Martin Walker. The Cold War: A History (New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 1994), 16.
33Resume. 22.
34Larson, "Belief and Inference," 194.
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realized that military power was primarily effective in 
opposing military power or in deterring another's use of 
it.35
The British policy of appeasement in the 1930s had 
convinced Truman that only the willingness to use 
preponderant force could deter aggressors. In a 1944 
speech, Truman asked: "Who can say what the results would 
have been if France had prevented Hitler from occupying the 
Rhineland. Timely action might have deterred Italy's 
conquest of Ethiopia." Truman also believed that the 
failure of the Allied Powers to make a lasting peace with 
Germany planted the seeds of World War II.36
President Truman frequently used his knowledge of 
history to make points about foreign affairs. At Potsdam he 
declared that he had come to the conclusion after studying 
history that the wars of the last two hundred years had 
started in the area from the Black Sea to the Baltic and 
from the eastern frontier of France to the western frontier 
of Russia. In the last two instances, Austria and Germany 
had overturned the peace. He thought it was the purpose of 
the Potsdam Conference to make sure it did not happen again.
35Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years In 
The State Department (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 732.
36Speech in Toledo, Ohio, 14 June 1944, Address and 
Statement of Harry S. Truman: A Topical Record from January 
1935 to April 1945, United States News. File: Addresses and 
Statements of Harry S. Truman 1935-1945 (Publication), 
Biographical File, Box 298, PSF, HSTL.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
He did not want to go to war in another twenty-five 
years.37
In a joint statement with Senators Elbert Thomas of 
Utah and Harley Kilgore of West Virginia on 7 March 1944 
Truman declared that the industrial accomplishments of the 
United States had nominated it as the nation to guide others 
in the pathway of peaceful production. For Truman: "the 
future peace depends on the abandonment of political 
nationalism and economic imperialism and autarchy."38 
Later he said: "We must do our utmost to win the war 
speedily and also to contribute our full share to a postwar 
atmosphere that will be conducive to an endurable peace."39
Truman based his national defense policy on lessons he 
learned before the war. He favored a strong mobilization 
capability over a large standing army because he thought the 
American people would not tolerate a large defense 
establishment. He also warned that large defense 
expenditures would bankrupt the nation. Truman believed
37U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States: The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam 
Conference) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office), 2:303-305. (Hereafter cited as FRUS with year and 
volume number.)
“ "Addresses and Statements of Harry S. Truman: A 
Topical Record from January, 1935 to April 1945," United 
States News. File: Addresses and Statements of Harry S. 
Truman 1935-1945 (Publication), Biographical File, Box 298, 
PSF, HSTL.
“Ibid., 4 July 1943.
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that the economic capabilities and the postwar prestige of 
the United States could achieve its security objectives 
without a large military establishment. He favored 
universal military training, air power and atomic weapons to 
reduce manpower costs as much as possible.40
National Defense Preparedness
I believe in an adequate national defense program. I 
think that the old Puritan who prayed regularly for 
protection against the Indians was much safer when, at 
the same time, he prudently kept his powder dry. Andrew 
Jackson, the fighting old President from Tennessee, 
said,"We shall more certainly preserve peace when it is 
understood that we are prepared for war. The best way to 
keep from fighting for liberty and honor is to be 
adequately prepared for all contingencies.41
Truman believed in an adequate Navy and an Air Force 
second to none, and only enough soldiers for training.
Since ships and aircraft could not be built overnight, they 
had to be on hand and prepared. The United States had to be 
prepared enough to defend itself, but not enough to become 
an aggressor.42 He declared in the fall of 1945 that the 
United States had to shoulder the responsibility of 
universal military training for "in order to carry out a 
just decision the courts must have marshals" and "in order
40Robert A. Pollard, "The National Security State 
Reconsidered: Truman and Economic Containment, 1945-1950" in 
Lacey, The Truman Presidency. 207.
41 Resume. 57.
42Ibid., 56.
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to collect monies for county government it has been found 
necessary to employ a sheriff."43
Truman was definitely committed to a policy of adequate 
preparedness as a necessary ingredient in a comprehensive 
formula for maintaining peace. In this connection he 
advocated that the United States clarify its rights to the 
overseas bases it constructed during the war. He also 
wanted the United States to investigate the possibility of 
permanently obtaining access to petroleum rights abroad.44
Harry Truman was also an extremely strong advocate of 
unification of the armed forces into a single department of 
national defense.45. "Lack of unity of command was one of 
the most important circumstances attributing [sic] to the 
disaster at Pearl Harbor." To Truman only divine providence 
had protected the United States so far in spite of our 
"scrambled professional military setup."46 Harkening back 
to his days as an active soldier and a presiding judge, 
Truman saw a requirement to consolidate the Army and the 
Navy "under one tent and one authoritative, responsible 
command." Truman believed that Pearl Harbor revealed the
43Thomas G. Paterson. On Every Front: The Making and 
the Unmaking of the Cold War, rev. ed. (New York: W.W.
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danger that lies in a division of responsibilities."47 As 
late as August 1944 he and his fellow committee members were 
still "recording a dreary succession of wastes, duplications 
and ugly conflict."46
Senate Voting Record
During the ten years he spent in the Senate, Harry 
Truman's voting record reflected his list of priorities on 
various foreign and domestic policy issues. In foreign 
affairs he advocated increased American international 
involvement, enthusiastically supported the United Nations, 
and advocated freer international trade. In regard to 
defense preparedness, party loyalty and an orientation to 
crisis action influenced his votes. In most domestic issues 
he followed the party line and administration guidance.49
In 1935 Senator Truman voted for United States' 
participation in the World Court. In 1941 he supported 
proposals requiring Senate ratification of the Roosevelt 
Administration's Trade Acts and extension of the Selective 
Service System and the Ship Seizure Bill, both aimed at 
strengthening the United States' preparation for war. A
47Harry S Truman, "Our Armed Forces MUST Be Unified," 
Colliers. 214 (26 August 1944): 16.
46Ibid., 63.
49Gary M. Fink and James W. Hilty, "Prologue: The 
Senate Voting Record of Harry S. Truman," Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 4 (Autumn 1973): 231.
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magazine reporter characterized Truman's voting record as 
follows: "since 1935 his position on foreign relations and
international policy has been consistently on the side of 
F.D.R. and for the fight against Fascism.50
Personal Philosophy
A profile of the new vice-president noted: "It is not
opprobrious in Mr.Truman's lexicon to be called a
politician. He comes as near as being scornful as his 
nature permits when he speaks of officeholders who are not 
politicians." "Government is politics," Truman says, "and
government which is not in the hands of skilled and honest
politicians is less likely to be good government."51
Throughout his political career Harry Truman followed 
the "code of the politician" which he had learned from Tom 
Pendergast. The code essentially said that a man who did 
not keep his word could never be trusted again. Truman 
always attached great importance to keeping his promises.
He had insisted on paying off all his creditors when it 
would have been easier to declare bankruptcy and walk away 
from them after his business failed in the 1920s. Truman's 
experience as a member of the Pendergast machine taught him
50"Compilation of Information and Statements Which May 
Indicate or Suggest Possible Policies of President Truman," 
Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget, 
Washington, D.C., April, 1945, PM Magazine. 15 April 1945, 
1-2, Biographical File, Box 298: PSF, HSTL.
51Ibid., 8.
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to place the highest importance on the principle of keeping 
one's word. This came to be the standard that Truman used 
when he became president to judge all potential political 
allies, including Soviet leader Josef Stalin.52
Truman brought this legalistic view to bear on his 
foreign relations. Men with whom he could do business, 
whether political bosses or foreign leaders, had to be 
honest, at least in the fundamental matter of keeping their 
word. Honest leaders, therefore, scrupulously observed the 
agreements they had made with other nations. To Truman 
wartime agreements between the United States and the Soviet 
Union made at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam were crystal clear 
with no room for different interpretations of their 
obligations.53 Truman later found it intolerable that the 
Russians would disregard the Yalta agreements.54
Truman, like Roosevelt, had a tendency to personalize 
diplomacy and to conceptualize it in terms of his political 
experience. He was, however, less sophisticated than 
Roosevelt. Stalin impressed him quite favorably at the 
Potsdam Conference; affected by Stalin's apparent candor and 
by the blunt strength of his personality, Truman remarked 
that the Russian reminded him of Tom Pendergast. "Stalin is
52Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A 
Psychological Explanation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1985), 132.
53Hamby, Liberalism and Its Challengers, 74.
54FRUS, 1945 5:235.
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as near like Tom Pendergast as any man I know. He is very 
fond of classical music. He can see right straight through 
a question quickly." Stalin gave Truman the impression 
that, like Pendergast, Stalin meant to stand by his word 
when he gave it.55 Truman wrote his wife, Bess, "Stalin 
felt so friendly that he toasted the pianist. The old boy 
loves music."56 On July 29th he wrote "I like Stalin. He 
is straightforward. Knows what he wants and will compromise 
when he can’t get it. His foreign minister isn’t so 
forthright."57 Truman also thought he could win him over 
with frank talk. Truman wrote in his diary that "I can deal 
with Stalin. He is honest-but smart as hell."56 Henry A. 
Wallace wrote on 15 October 1945 that Truman said that 
Stalin was a fine man who wanted to do the right thing.59 
"It is always easy to understand and to get along with big 
men. "60
“ Research Notes Used In Conjunction With Writing The 
Man of Independence, Part I, Notes on Interviews, Interview 
with Harry S. Truman, 30 August 1949, 4, Daniels Papers, 
HSTL. See also Daniels, The Man of Independence. 23, 278.
“ Ferrell, Dear Bess. 520.
57Ibid., 522.
“ Ferrell, Off The Record. 53.
“Henry A. Wallace, The Price of Vision: The Diary of 
Henry A. Wallace. 1942-1946 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1973), 490.
60Joseph E. Davies Diary, 25 July 1945, Davies Papers, 
Library of Congress.
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For Truman, it had not been easy to get a commitment 
from Pendergast, but when Pendergast made one, he kept it. 
Truman felt he could get a division of responsibilities and 
territory with Stalin much like the one he had arranged with 
Pendergast a decade before when Truman was presiding judge 
of Jackson County and Pendergast the Boss of Kansas City. 
When the hope of a compromise came to an end, Truman felt 
that it was not Stalin's fault, but the fault of the 
politburo.61 Truman later stated that Stalin would "stand 
by his agreements".62
The Influence of History
President Harry S. Truman made more use of history than 
most of his predecessors in the White House. The lives of 
famous men and women intrigued him, but the reading of 
biography was more than the romance of heroes, for he looked 
into their background to find an explanation for their 
success and failure. In public addresses and in his Memoirs 
he clearly acknowledges how the precedents of former 
presidents had instructed and encouraged him. 63
61 Robert H. Ferrell, "Harry S. Truman: A Chance 
President and the New World of Superpowers," Prologue (Fall 
1994): 161.
62Eldorous L. Dayton, Give 'em Hell Harry: An Informal 
Biography of the Terrible Tempered Mr. T. (New York: The 
Devin-Adair Company, 1956), 102.
63R.G. Cowherd, "Mr. Truman's Uses of History," The 
Social Studies. 50 (April 1959): 142.
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His Memoirs are filled with references to historical lessons 
which, he said, guided him in making presidential decisions. 
He often remembered how Abraham Lincoln dealt with 
recalcitrant generals; how he tried to avoid President 
Wilson's errors with Congress; and how he made sure he would 
not become another Andrew Johnson.64
In Truman's own words: "My debt to history is one which 
cannot be calculated. I know of no other motivation which so 
accounts for my awakening interest as a young lad in the 
principles of leadership and government." He was 
particularly intrigued by past great administrators. He 
wanted "to know what caused the success or the failures of 
all the famous leaders of history.65 The New York Times 
described Truman's use of history after he became Vice- 
president: "History is Senator Truman's hobby. The study of 
it is his chief relaxation. He likes any sort of history, 
but his favorites are the constitutional history of the 
United States and military history in any form."66
Truman believed in the "great man" theory of history 
which holds that the actions of leaders explain historic 
events. In 1939, Truman traced the periodic recurrence of 
wars to the inability of Caesar, King Henry IV of France,
64J. Garry Clifford, "President Truman and Peter the 
Great's Will," Diplomatic History 4 (Fall 1980): 371.
65Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Year of Decisions, (Garden 
City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), 119.
66New York Times Magazine. 21 January 1945, 8.
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Napoleon and Woodrow Wilson to carry out their plans for 
eliminating trade barriers. Caesar and Napoleon wanted to 
place Europe, Asia and Africa under the control of the same 
state, but both failed, the former due to assassination, 
the latter due to an adventure in Russia. King Henry IV 
looked to unify Europe under one state, but was also 
assassinated before he could put it together.67 Truman 
believed that World War I was caused by Germany's need for 
raw materials to run her industries and feed her growing 
population.68
As one of his most intimate advisors, Clark Clifford, 
noted, the knowledge that President Truman had of American 
history "was second to none." Incident after incident came 
up which Truman was able to trace back to one that another 
president had faced during his administration. Truman 
compared the discussion about the financial and monetary 
posture of the United States after World War II to that of 
the conflict between Andrew Jackson and Nicholas Biddle, the 
leading banker of the day, over the structure of the 
American banking system. Truman's knowledge of history was 
"not the kind of knowledge that just depended on dates and
67Congress, Senate. 1939. Speech in Carthersville, MO. 
76th Cong., 2nd Sess., Appendix to Congressional Record. (8 
October 1939), vol. 85, pt. 2, 202.
“Congress, Senate. 1939. Speech before the National 
Aviation Forum. 76th Cong., 1st Sess., Appendix to 
Congressional Record (20 February 1939), vol. 84, pt. 11, 
642.
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events, of 1066 being the Battle of Hastings." For Truman, 
"American history with him was the development of policy, 
the manner in which the various presidents had met difficult 
problems.1,69
The tragedies suffered by the Jewish people during the 
war reminded Truman of his Missouri-Kansas ancestors who had 
been displaced by the American Civil War. This led him to 
play an important role in the postwar history of the Jews. 
Truman insisted on a Nuremberg Tribunal to record the crimes 
committed against the Jews by the Nazis. He called upon the 
British to open Eretz Israel-Palestine to Jewish immigrants 
and he fought for a revision of American immigration laws. 
Truman was the first head of state to recognize the new 
state of Israel when its declared its independence.70
Elsewhere in his memoirs, Truman declares that he had 
trained himself to look back in history for precedents. He 
later reaffirmed that the lessons of history offered guides 
to the "right principles of action." Truman was convinced 
that the League of Nations had acted wrongly in not 
combining to resist its first challenges by Japan, Germany 
and Italy. He believed so strongly in these parallels from
69Clark M. Clifford, "The Unique and Inspiring 
Leadership of President Truman" in Levantrosser, The Man 
from Independence. 381.
70Herbert Druks, "Truman and the Recognition of Israel 
Reconsidered," Levantrosser, 55.
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the 1930s that in 1950 he weighed the North Korean invasion 
against the balance of these past experiences.71
Always self-conscious about his lack of higher 
education, Truman delighted in impressing others with his 
knowledge of the past, but his knowledge was neither 
systematic nor critical. He regarded history as a means of 
discovering lessons of the past, rather than as a tool of 
analysis. There are frequent references in his diaries and 
letters to what anyone from Alexander the Great to Andrew 
Jackson would have done in a particular circumstance. These 
lessons tended to reinforce his tendency to emphasize 
individual conduct rather than historical or cultural 
factors.72
Leadership Style
When Harry Truman became President, he brought to the 
White House a characteristic style of leadership acquired 
through his 61 years of service in war, business bankruptcy 
and elective office. Truman's experience as a captain of 
Army artillery in World War I was one of the most formative 
experiences of his life and helped shape his ideas about 
leadership. Leadership for Truman was the "ability to get 
other people to do what they don't want to do and like it."
71 Ernest R. May. "Lessons" of the Past: The Use and 
Misuse of History In American Foreign Policy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1973), 82-84.
72Ibid., 48.
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In a similar vein, when asked how he would behave as the 
head of the nation, Truman replied, "Just as I did when I 
was a judge in Jackson County.1,73
The new president was a man of a orderly habits and 
thought patterns. He was disturbed by the patterns of 
organizational jurisdiction that he had inherited from 
Roosevelt. Truman established a greater degree of 
orderliness than was seen in the Roosevelt White House with 
its few clear lines of authority and cognizance. Truman's 
staff organization was one of structured decentralization, 
unlike the system of unofficial advisors and conflicting and 
overlapping jurisdictions used by Roosevelt.74
His use of the cabinet reflected an almost textbook 
approach to the workings of government. As a constitutional 
formalist, he assumed that the president ran the executive 
branch and that the cabinet officers were his aides.75 He 
would later learn that the cabinet officers were executives 
in their own rights and had to be allowed to run their 
departments.
He brought to his new position a great sense of loyalty 
up and down the organizational ladder by virtue of his long 
service as an organization politician. When Truman became
73S.J. Woolf, "President Truman: A Portrait and 
Interview," The New York Times Magazine. 14 October 1945, 5.
74Hamby, "The Mind and Character of HST," 41.
75Ibid., 42.
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the "boss," he expected loyalty and gave an equal loyalty to 
his followers and subordinates. He did his best to smooth 
the way for them as they conducted their share of foreign 
policy. He respected their expertise and willingly made 
decisions based on their recommendations.76
Truman instinctively acted as a presiding judge in the 
White House. He dealt with issues one after the other, with 
little thought of those before and the ones coming in the 
future. He treated matters on a case-by-case basis, and was 
careful to receive information from a variety of sources.
He did not seek to find patterns in pieces of information, 
or to speculate about their implications. He concentrated 
on the "here and now," looking for what was to be decided, 
what bore directly on the case, and tended to dismiss all 
else as irrelevant.77
Truman saw the presidency as the focal point of the 
government, of the nation and of American history. He would 
not let personal proclivities or self-interest influence a 
presidential decision. Separating the presidency between 
the man and the office, he was conscious of each role he 
played. He played chief of state like a gracious host, 
leader of his party like an organization politician, and
76Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics 
of Leadership from FDR to Carter rev. ed. (New York: John 
Wiley and Sons, Co., 1980), 127.
77Ibid. , 126.
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chief of foreign policy as a career official reminding all 
that politics stops at the water's edge.78
Truman brought to the White House a consummate ability 
as a politician. For Truman the politician was the ablest 
man in government. Truman had acute political instincts, 
developed in the election campaigns he had waged for county 
judge and senator. He recognized that foreign policy had to 
have the backing of the people. Only by explaining and 
interpreting isolated actions in terms of a wider vision of 
the role of the United States could the president gain 
popular support for a policy. In world affairs Truman 
conceived of his role as being one of persuading the 
American people, rather than issuing edicts and 
proclamations.79
Truman saw himself as the heir of FDR, of the New Deal 
and of internationalism, but he had had only thirty official 
appointments with President Roosevelt between 1935 and April 
1945. Twenty-one of these had occurred before 1943. Four 
had taken place in 1944 (August 18, September 19, November 
10, December 21) and five in 1945 (January 2, 9, and 20; 
March 8 and 19).80
78Ibid., 129.
79Alfred Steinberg, The Man from Missouri: The Life and 
Times of Harry S Truman (New York: Doubleday, 1962), 88-89.
80NT to NL Memorandum of 4 November 1963, Harry S.
Truman Background, HST Appointments with FDR, 1935-1945,
PPF, HSTL.
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The contrasts between Harry S Truman and his 
predecessor made the presidential transition even more 
shocking., Roosevelt's patrician bearing, his easy 
confidence, and his eloquence gave him a presence Truman 
lacked. FDR had been on the national scene for decades as 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy during World War I, as a 
vice presidential candidate in 1920 and as governor of New 
York. Truman, on the other hand, was a smaller personality. 
He had commanded an artillery battery in World War I, 
started and lost a business in Kansas City and had served 
three terms as a county administrative judge before becoming 
senator in 1935.61
The New York Times declared that the way Truman 
directed his Senate committee afforded the best yardstick by 
which to appraise the methods he might use in handling the 
vastly greater responsibilities of his new office. Those 
who looked for great changes should bear in mind his 
inherent caution; he might be influenced by a west of the 
Mississippi ideology. Truman thought that politics was a 
proper and honorable calling and that government should be 
in the hands of capable and honest politicians.82
President Roosevelt liked the bold stroke. Truman was 
less audacious, a great deal less of a political showman and
“ Robert J. Maddox, From War to Cold War: The Education 
of Harry S.Truman (London: Westview Press, 1988), 46.
“ Luther Huston, "Truman's Record Shows Practical, 
Prudent Man," New York Times. 15 April 1945.
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was not by any means as self-assured and self-sufficient as 
his late chief. Basing their judgment on Truman's 
personality and on his almost wholly legislative background 
in national affairs, the Times anticipated that political 
councils would indeed be councils during the Truman 
regime.83
Summary
Truman's principal task, which he managed with only 
occasional errors and considerable aplomb, was to turn the 
foreign policy of the United States from isolation and 
occasional intervention in Europe's affairs to a necessary 
participation in world affairs.84 A man with less 
historical knowledge might have put his head in the noose of 
the isolationists, who quoted Washington's Farewell Address. 
Truman compared the isolationists to preachers who quoted 
Bible verses out of context. By relating doctrines to 
conditions, Truman became convinced that the growth of the 
United States had long ago invalidated Washington's method 
of making the United States secure.86
According to Leon Keyserling, Vice Chairman of Truman's 
Council of Economic Advisors, Truman was determined to
83Ibid.
84Ferrell, "HST: A Chance President," 153.
86R.G. Cowherd, "Mr. Truman's Uses of History," The
Social Studies. 50 (April 1959): 144.
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remain the type of man he was before he became president.
The problems which confronted Truman challenged him and 
enabled him to do many more things than he had ever done 
before. As president, he acted as he did because he was the 
kind of man he had always been.
The unimpeachable honesty which resisted political 
conditions in Missouri was the same quality that was evident 
in the White House. The loyalty to friends that caused him 
criticism in the White House was the same loyalty that he 
had demonstrated earlier in Missouri. As Keyserling put it: 
"In essence, Harry Truman did not change much as a man 
during his Presidency; it was merely that the flowering was 
preceded by the seed and long cultivation." As President, 
"he surprised others, but never himself."86 Just as Truman 
saw himself as a reflection of the American common man, he 
saw his foreign policy - the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall 
Plan and Point Four - as a reflection of the American 
character, his character: a generosity combined with a 
principled toughness.87 The quickness and the firmness of 
his foreign policy decisions which were the hallmark of his 
tenure as Chief Executive were the same as those he had 
exercised as Presiding Judge back in Jackson County.
86Leon H. Keyserling, "Harry S. Truman: The Man and the 
President" in Levantrosser, The Man from Independence. 237.
87Norman Podhoretz, "Truman and the Idea of the Common 
Man," Commentary 21 (May 1956): 474.
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CHAPTER 4 
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
On 20 January 1953, the wartime commander 
of the Allied Powers, Dwight David Eisenhower, became the 
thirty-fourth President of the United States. General of 
the Army Eisenhower brought a unique background and an 
unusual range of experiences to his new position as he took 
his place at the pinnacle of American achievement and power. 
Eisenhower had already made his mark as a military leader, 
but what predispositions from his past did he bring to his 
presidency?
Among other character traits, Dwight David Eisenhower 
brought to the presidency a style of leadership and 
management that he had used to become one of the most 
successful military men of the twentieth century. Part and 
parcel of this style was the abiding sense of duty which had 
guided and formed his life. His mother, Ida, had 
continually emphasized the virtues of self-reliance, hard 
work, and doing one's duty as the most important of personal 
values. Throughout his life Eisenhower held fast to these
60
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values and remembered that his mother's greatest belief was 
that of self-discipline.1
Early in the twentieth century, Eisenhower was admitted 
to the United States Military Academy at West Point where he 
and his fellow cadets were indoctrinated into a Progressive 
ideal of an efficient, professionalized Army which carried 
with it an accompanying devotion to an apolitical creed. 
Politics was seen by the cadets and their superiors as 
contentious partisanship and divisive clamor. It was the 
duty of the good officer to avoid the corrupting influence 
of politics on teamwork and efficiency. The concept of duty 
was the watchword of the military ideal, the justification 
for channeled ambition and the preserver of military virtue. 
This overarching ideal of duty was to carry Eisenhower 
through the many dry years of Army service.2 Indeed, 
he once told his wife, Mamie, "My country comes first. You 
come second."3
Eisenhower always took his responsibilities seriously 
and worked hard in whatever activity he was assigned, 
winning a string of plaudits from his commanding officers. 
General Douglas MacArthur described Eisenhower in an
'Robert E. Gilbert, The Mortal Presidency: Illness and 
Anguish in the White House (New York: Basic Books, 1992),
75.
2Robert F. Burk, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Hero and 
Politician (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1986), 23.
3Michael Beschloss, Eisenhower (New York: Edward 
Burlingame, 1990), 28.
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efficiency report, writing: "This officer has no superior of 
his time either in command or general staff capacity in the 
Army.4
During his Army career four generals took Eisenhower 
under their wings and developed mentor or student-teacher 
relationships with him: Fox Connor, John J. Pershing,
Douglas MacArthur and George C. Marshall. Connor probably 
had the greatest influence on Eisenhower's early development 
as a strategic thinker while they were both assigned to the 
Panama Canal Zone. For three years Connor instructed 
Eisenhower in the military arts. It was for Eisenhower "a 
sort of graduate school in military affairs and the 
humanities. . . .!|S Connor prepared Eisenhower in 
classical military strategy, but he also instilled in 
Eisenhower a principle which became a hallmark of 
Eisenhower's leadership style and one of the keys to his
success, namely the need for allied unity.6
His military duties before World War II also gave the
future president at least a fringe familiarity with 
decisions affecting high officials of the executive branch. 
In 1929 as a major, Eisenhower was appointed personal 
assistant to the Assistant Secretary of War, and in February
“Efficiency Report dated 30 June 1936 by General 
Douglas MacArthur, Eisenhower Museum, Abilene, KS-
5Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell To 
Friends (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967), 178.
6Ibid., 199.
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1933 to the Chief of Staff of the Army, Douglas MacArthur. 
Eisenhower's duties concerned such matters as military 
budgets, public affairs, and relations between the Executive 
Branch and the Congress.7 Eisenhower produced an overall 
strategy and blueprint for war mobilization; his plan was 
not adopted, but it gave him a detailed knowledge of what 
was to become the arsenal of democracy.8 He later 
recollected that without the administrative experience he 
gained while serving under MacArthur he "would not have been 
ready for the great responsibilities of the war period."9
As the war in Europe broke out, Eisenhower began a 
spectacular rise to the top of the Army. In mid-1941, he 
was Chief of Staff of the Third Army. Five days after Pearl 
Harbor he was reassigned to Washington by the Chief of 
Staff, General George C. Marshall.10 Marshall had been 
following Eisenhower's career for several years and believed 
that he had acquired the knowledge and maturity to help 
shape the strategic plans for the defeat of Germany and 
Japan. While assigned to the War Department, Eisenhower 
absorbed Marshall's managerial philosophy, the two most
’David B. Capitanchik, The Eisenhower Presidency and 
American Foreign Policy (London: Routledge Paul, 1969), 5-6.
8Burk, DDE: Hero and Politician. 37.
9Kenneth S. Davis, Soldier of Democracy (Garden City,
NY: Doubleday and Company, 1946), 146.
10Chester J. Pach, Jr. and Elmo Richardson, eds., The 
Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower rev.ed. (Lawrence, KS: 
University of Kansas Press, 1991), 6.
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important tenets of which were: first, the decision-maker 
must not be distracted by problems that subordinates should 
resolve for themselves; and second, the assistants must have 
ready the precise information needed to make decisions.11
By 1945 Eisenhower had spent thirteen years overseas in 
contact with nearly every head of state in Western Europe 
and had commanded history's largest army. He had spoken 
with Churchill, Eden, Macmillan, Stalin, Roosevelt and ae 
Gaulle. He had commanded forces from France, America, 
Britain, the Commonwealth, Poland and Czechoslovakia. He 
had led the Western Alliance to victory. Never before had a 
single individual won the trust and confidence of so many 
people and so many competing national interests. Eisenhower 
emerged from the war with expertise in many areas: 
intelligence systems, clandestine operations, calculated 
risk-taking, censorship, and press conferences. As Truman's 
Army Chief of Staff and the first commander of NATO, he 
played a key role in France's eventual decision to join NATO 
and he had steered that organization through its formative 
years.12 After the war Eisenhower became the symbol of the 
victorious Western democracies. His image was that of the 
gentle Christian warrior, the noble crusader returned from 
the war against the Nazi infidels. He inspired immense
“ Ibid., 6.
“Frederick W. Marks, III, Power and Peace: The 
Diplomacy of John Foster Dulles (London: Praeger, 1993), 21.
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public confidence.13 Eisenhower derived additional benefit 
from a term as president of Columbia University from 1948 to 
1950.14
Eisenhower was a hero seeking national unity and a 
return to the code of personal responsibility. He became 
president to change the perception that the state was 
responsible for taking the individual from the cradle to the 
grave.15 The undeniable call of duty16 and the threat of 
Senator Robert Taft's isolationism convinced him to run for 
the presidency.17 In the final analysis Eisenhower did not 
know which was worse, the danger of national bankruptcy or 
isolationism, but he knew he had to stop both.18 He did 
not seek the presidency, but managed his public and private 
life in such a manner that the presidency sought him. His 
love was not for power, but for duty.19 Moreover,
Eisenhower was supremely confident in his sense of his own 
fitness for the job.
13Burk, DDE: Hero and Politician. 93.
14Ibid., 23.
15Robert H. Ferrell, ed., The Eisenhower Diaries (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1981), 374.
“Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President 
(New York,Simon and Schuster, 1990), 246.
17Ferrell, The Eisenhower Diaries. 252.
“ Ibid., 264.
“Gilbert, The Mortal Presidency. 121.
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Eisenhower was unique among American presidents in that 
he had spent all but two years of his career before election 
to the presidency in uniform; only Eisenhower among the 
modern presidents had never held elective office in his pre- 
presidential career. However, his experience in foreign 
affairs was without parallel among the presidents of the 
twentieth century.20
Professional Skills
Eisenhower's military success was due to his ability to 
plan and to coordinate complex military operations. As 
Assistant Chief of Staff in charge of war plans under 
General Marshall, Eisenhower was responsible for the 
preparation of a plan for the invasion of Europe across the 
English Channel— in rough outline the same plan he was to 
follow two years and three months later.21 Marshall's 
office also became a school room in which Eisenhower learned 
many lessons useful to him in the final development of his 
own command technique. He learned about the most effective 
melding of military and political leadership on the level of 
supreme command. Eisenhower also noted how Marshall allowed 
his subordinates to operate within the limits of their
20Capitanchik, The Eisenhower Presidency. 1.
21Ibid., 6-7.
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abilities, limits which Marshall measured with great 
shrewdness.22
Eisenhower saw that Marshall never condescended, never 
presumed to issue orders to civilians, and never impugned 
the motives of his opponents on specific issues. Marshall 
made no grandiose public gestures calculated to inflame 
prejudices or outrage the convictions of those who 
distrusted the military. Marshall counted on the truth to 
win its own points; when he won over a former opponent, he 
never gloated over it. In his view, such a victory was 
never personal; it meant simply that his former opponent, 
like himself, now recognized an objective reality.
Eisenhower applied these lessons exceptionally well both as 
the principal Allied commander in Europe and as President of 
the United States.23
Eisenhower's success as a commander was also due to two 
factors which were particularly relevant to his presidency. 
The first was his effort to promote allied unity, teamwork, 
and harmony. Eisenhower was particularly skillful at 
finding compromises, sometimes at the expense of weakening 
overall strategy, but with the knowledge that frequently 
political as well as military considerations had to be taken 
into account. The second factor was Eisenhower's grasp of
22Davis, Soldier of Democracy. 294.
23Paul G. Munch, "General George C. Marshall and the 
Army Staff" Military Review 74 (August 1994): 18.
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the requirements of a modern executive which led him to a 
view of institutional leadership which was reflected in his 
presidency. 24
Eisenhower's postwar appointment as the military 
commander of NATO further enhanced his wartime experience.
He honed his diplomatic skills by convincing the European 
governments of the need for unity. At the same time he had 
to reassure Americans in Congress and the public at large of 
the need for continued American involvement in Europe.25
Eisenhower himself saw a "great carry-over" in the way 
he acted as Army general and as president. He did not 
abandon his previous methods of getting information on which 
he had to make decisions. Eisenhower had become accustomed 
both as commander and as president to getting essential 
information from summary sheets or briefings from his staff. 
He would get the facts and the views from people around him, 
particularly when they had some expertise in one particular 
facet of a problem.26 He continued this practice as 
president in order to master the essentials quickly and to 
make a decision. He read portions of books or articles 
brought to his attention and continued to show a keen 
ability to cut to the heart of an issue. His extraordinary
24Capitanchik, The Eisenhower Presidency. 9.
25Ibid., 11.
260ral History Interview with General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower by Ed Edwin, 20 July 1967, OH-11, Interview #1: 
106, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (DDEL), Abilene, KS.
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involvement in world affairs also provided him with a
breadth of knowledge that awed many of his aides.27
Eisenhower's respect for experts, however, rarely led him to
accept their judgement over his own in the vital areas of
foreign policy and military policy where he was himself 
particularly knowledgeable.28
Leadership Style
During his military career, Eisenhower developed a 
style of leadership in which smooth running teams posed 
alternatives for his decision. Policy was made achievable 
by seeking consensus among all those operationally 
responsible for implementing an action. He carried over 
from his military experience these organizational concepts 
and principles of leadership into his new position as 
President of the United States. Due to his personality and 
his experiences as a staff officer, Eisenhower placed a 
premium on the views of his staff officers and, particularly 
when they reached agreement, might favor their position over 
his own. To Eisenhower the duty of a staff was to bring the 
leader the minimum number of issues for his decision. When 
the commander's decision was ultimately necessary, the staff 
was to come with an agreed upon course of action or clear- 
cut, well-defined alternatives.
27Pach and Richardson, The Presidency of DDE. 40.
28Capitanchik, The Eisenhower Presidency. 10.
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Writing in I960, Walt Rostow summed up Eisenhower's 
leadership principles. First, the leader should provide 
continuity to an organization or institution by articulating 
his abiding values and by ensuring that day-to-day decisions 
maintained this continuity and conformed to his values. 
Second, the leader should refrain from imposing his own 
judgements on appropriate courses of action. He should seek 
to create a consensus through mutual persuasion and 
negotiation in which the diverse tasks and functions of the 
organization are brought into harmony.29
Third, when the leader is forced to make a decision 
after the process of persuasion and negotiation are 
exhausted, he must take final responsibility for the 
decision but in such away that the conflicting interests and 
views of the organization are embedded in the decision. 
Fourth, when a decision is made, the course of action should 
be followed unless an overwhelming case for change is 
developed by new circumstances. Fifth, primary 
responsibility for day-to-day policy rests with those 
responsible for the particular operational task which had to 
be accomplished under conditions of maximum mutual 
accommodation. Finally, the leader must have a strong chief 
of staff, capable of forcing decisions to be made at the
29Rostow, The United States In the World Arena. 388.
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lowest level possible and of screening out issues brought to 
the leader for action.30
Eisenhower implemented this last principle in the White 
House as soon as he assumed office. He installed a chief of 
staff for domestic affairs in the person of Sherman Adams.
As such, Adams was able to function in the same manner as 
his military predecessors: Walter Bedell Smith, Lucius Clay, 
and Alfred Gruenther. As president, Eisenhower also 
selected men and women for his cabinet who conformed to his 
conception of able technicians, the equivalent of his 
commanders during the war. Day-to-day control over routine 
matters and foreign policy implementation devolved into the 
hands of these department heads while he retained decision­
making power on key issues.31
Staff Management
Eisenhower was a master executive, confident in his 
abilities to operate large staff organizations. His command 
structure was deliberate, complex, and finely tuned to his 
requirements. He recognized that it was impossible for him 
to be personally involved in every detail of every issue. In 
his view effective leadership required managerial skills to 
sort out decisions requiring the executive's personal 
attention from matters of lesser importance which could be
30Ibid., 388.
31Ibid., 190.
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handled by subordinates. He himself had filled the staff 
officer's role enough times to know that no command 
structure could overcome the problem of the wrong person in 
a key position. Confident that he had selected the best 
person, he then delegated maximum responsibility to his 
subordinates and his appointees.32
In dealing with his staff, Eisenhower gave mission 
orders and made his subordinates fully responsible for their 
actions and their results. The technique he had learned 
from Marshall was simple. Marshall's relationship with 
Eisenhower had been typical of Marshall's mode of leadership 
and he followed a similar approach with other officers under 
him. "Army officers are intelligent," General Marshall 
would say. "Give them the bare tree, let them supply the 
leaves."33 Marshall defined the task and his expectations 
and then ordered the officer to develop a plan. After 
reviewing the plan, Eisenhower, as Marshall had done with 
him, directed the officer to execute the plan while 
Eisenhower monitored his progress. Both Marshall and 
Eisenhower expected the responsible officer to make timely 
decisions within the confines of his responsibility. Just 
as the broad responsibilities given to Eisenhower shortly 
after Pearl Harbor were the rule rather than the exception
32Davis, Soldier of Democracy. 263.
33Edgar F. Puryear, Nineteen Stars (Orange, VA: Green 
Publishers, Inc., 1971), 81.
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on Marshall's staff, Eisenhower gave broad responsibilities 
to his subordinates when he became a commander in his own 
right and later as president.34
According to one of his speechwriters, Eisenhower knew 
he wasn't an expert in everything. Bruce Harlow described 
him as a great commander who would depend on his corps 
commander to tell him what was going on in the corps.
"That's the way he believed, the way he was trained in 
delegation. It was one of his great skills. That's one of 
the hardest skills to master — how to delegate."35
In numerous interviews and correspondence, Eisenhower's 
staff officers stated that Eisenhower was the boss, that he 
was a commander who would listen to all sides of an issue, 
extract its root element, and work out a solution. General 
Walter B. Smith, Eisenhower's wartime Chief of Staff, 
described his ability to delegate authority to his staff as 
"beautiful." Eisenhower was so gifted that he could 
literally put his finger quickly and accurately on the crux 
of the problem under discussion.36
Herbert Brownell, Eisenhower's Attorney General, would 
echo Smith's words in describing Eisenhower years later.
34Munch, "Marshall and the Army Staff," 20.
35Bruce Harlow, "The "Compleat" President," in The 
Eisenhower Presidency: Eleven Intimate Perspectives of 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson, (Lanham, MD: 
University of America Press, 1984), 148.
36Puryear, Nineteen Stars. 212.
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"He delegated a maximum of authority, keeping an eagle eye 
on what was going on. He helped me in the selection of 
associates without interfering.1137
Teamwork and Cooperation
More than any other event in his life the Second World 
War shaped and consolidated Eisenhower's worldview and 
leadership philosophy. The war was a potent lesson in 
international relations; the Allies were faced with the 
choice of cooperation or domination. Eisenhower was the 
linchpin of the cooperative effort that defeated the 
Germans. He designed and managed the meeting place between 
the political and military policies of the United States and 
Great Britain, and to a lesser degree, that of the Soviet 
Union and France.38
Eisenhower's self-portrait, Crusade in Europe, opened 
with the theme of cooperation which would run through the 
entire work. It would be linked with related terms such as 
unity, teamwork, allies, and partnership. The theme 
connoted the picture of a leader who believed that the 
greatest safety lay in numbers and the soundest wisdom in a 
variety of voices.39
37Herbert Brownell, "From Campaigning to Governance" in 
Thompson, Eleven Intimate Perspectives. 168.
38Davis, Soldier of Democracy. 131.
39Martin J. Medhurst, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Strategic 
Communicator (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 13.
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Eisenhower became increasingly convinced of the need 
for "this combined stuff."40 Teamwork to Eisenhower meant 
subordinating personal, service, and even national interest 
to a common goal. He often drew analogies from his football 
coaching days about the need for "team play."41 The need 
for teamwork became a permanent addition to Eisenhower's 
leadership philosophy and it resurfaced in nearly every 
undertaking. This sense of teamwork enabled him to work 
with leaders as strong-willed as Douglas MacArthur, Bernard 
Montgomery, Charles de Gaulle, Admiral Ernest King, and 
George S. Patton. One of his remarkable talents was the 
ability to subordinate his personal views to his sense of 
duty and the need for teamwork.42
As early as 1943, Eisenhower spoke of "Allied team 
play" as one of the greatest gains made from the North 
African Campaign. "Each man here has come to realize that 
the greatest patriot, the greatest lover of his country, is 
one that is the quickest to promote Allied team play and to 
demand its perfection.1143 The war years consolidated 
Eisenhower's faith in cooperative approaches to national and
40Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary, 8 March 1942, DDEL.
“Eisenhower, At Ease. 16.
“Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary, 20 April 1942, DDEL.
“ Radio talk by Gen Eisenhower for North African 
Program of BBC, 24 May 1943. Box 192, Principal File (PF), 
Dwight D. Eisenhower: Papers, Pre-presidential, 1916-52 
(PPP), DDEL.
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international security. The teamwork concept he applied to 
his staff operations during the war appealed to him in a 
much broader sense than as only a mechanism to persuade 
individuals to work together. If nations could work 
together in war, why couldn't they in peace?44
Following the war Eisenhower spoke of teamwork as the 
device to preclude wars of the future. In January 1946, he 
declared: "nations that joined together to defeat ruthless 
enemies have even greater reason to remain united for the 
peaceful settlement of their differences lest new Hitlers 
rise to throw the world into a chaos more awful than the 
shattered countries of Europe present today."45 In April 
1946, Eisenhower said "We must remain united in working for 
security in peace as we did for success in war."46 In 
November Eisenhower would plead for cooperation "because 
only cooperation will make this country great. . . . Guns 
and tanks are nothing unless there is a solid spirit, a 
solid heart, and a great productiveness behind it.47
Eisenhower saw that cooperation and teamwork were also 
needed within the Armed Forces. Unlike Truman who wanted to
44Eisenhower, Crusade In Europe (New York: Doubleday, 
1978), 486.
45Speech before Canadian Club, Ottawa, Canada, 10 
January 1946, Box 192, PF, PPP, DDEL.
46Army Day Speech, Chicago, II., 6 April 1946, Box 192, 
PF, PPP, DDEL.
47Address before the Economic Club of New York at 
Dinner Meeting, 20 November 1946, Box 192, PF, PPP, DDEL.
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unify the Armed Forces to reduce duplication and government 
spending, Eisenhower wrote on 27 November 1945 that he 
wanted to foster "the closest possible kind of association 
among individuals" and to promote a spirit of teamwork among 
the services that would lead to the "model of unified, 
integrated and enthusiastic cooperation" he had engendered 
in Europe during the war.48
Personal Philosophy
Eisenhower's famous address at Guildhall, London,
England on 12 June 1945 contained many of the themes and
attitudes that would characterize his postwar stances:
cooperation, sacrifice, duty and humility.
No petty differences in the worlds of trade, national 
traditions and pride should ever blind us to these 
spiritual, priceless values. If we keep our eyes on this 
guidepost, then never can there be encountered a 
difficulty in our road of mutual cooperation that will be 
insurmountable.49
While the public only knew Eisenhower through wartime 
dispatches and occasional human interest stories,
Eisenhower would emerge over the next several years in 
speeches and letters as a special representative of the 
common man, with a dedication to high ideals, a 
consideration of others, humility and a special sort of 
moral vision. This speech provided an initial glimpse into
"Griffith, Ike's Letters To A Friend. 28-29.
49Medhurst, DDE: Strategic Communicator. 131.
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philosophy and beliefs of this wartime leader and future 
president.50
Eisenhower brought to the presidency a belief that the 
struggle between the East and the West represented two 
ideologically opposed systems. To him one system 
represented statism while the other represented the dignity 
of the individual, who had a soul and certain inalienable 
rights that could not be taken away.51 Human dignity, 
economic freedom and individual responsibility were the 
characteristics that distinguished democracy from all other 
governmental forms devised by humankind.52
Eisenhower's concept of this ideological struggle 
pitted democracy against statism without assuming that the 
United States and the Soviet Union were necessarily destined 
to go to war. Armed conflict was not inevitable, but the 
democracies had to rise to the challenge of the Soviet 
Union's increased power after the World War II. Isolationism 
would keep the United States from exerting a positive 
influence in world politics and would lead to Soviet 
opportunism in the Third World countries. The ultimate
50Ibid., 5.
“Address at Banquet of International Business Machines 
Corp., 14 July 1948, Box 192, PF, PPP, DDEL.
52West Virginia University Convocation, 23 September 
1947, Box 195, PF, PPP, DDEL.
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result would be that the United States would be shut out of 
opportunities for growth and development.53
A year later he would complement this theme of struggle 
with an outline of three fundamental principles of American 
life. First, "individual freedom is our most precious asset 
and the chief target of our enemies." Second, these 
personal, economic, social and political freedoms were 
bundled together in an inseparable manner. Diminution of 
one led to the diminution of all. Third, the freedom to 
compete vigorously and to cooperate wholeheartedly made the 
American system the most productive on earth.54
In a letter to Everett "Swede" Hazlett on 19 July 1947,
Eisenhower described his belief in the American form of
democracy. This system, Eisenhower wrote
recognizes and protects the rights of the individual. . . 
only through a system of free enterprise can this type of 
democracy be preserved. . . world order can be 
established only by the practice of true cooperation 
among sovereign nations. . . . American leadership 
towards this goal depends upon her strength-her strength 
of will, her moral, social and economic strength and, 
until an effective world order is achieved, upon her 
military strength.55
Alongside these principles lay Eisenhower's dedication 
to the "middle way." The path to America's future led down
53Zachery Shands Davis, "Eisenhower's Worldview and 
Nuclear Strategy" (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 
1989), 5.
“Address before the American Bar Association, St. 
Louis, MO, 5 September 1949, Box 193, PF, PPP, DDEL.
“Griffith, Ike's Letters To A Friend. 40.
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the "middle of the road between unfettered power of 
concentrated wealth on one flank, and the unbridled power of 
statism, or partisan interest on the other." For Eisenhower 
these principles and adherence to "the middle way" provided 
the setting to resolve all acute differences.56
Eisenhower also believed that intelligent people were 
not isolationists and that a nation's security demanded 
participation in the community of nations. Both at home and 
abroad economic aid was necessary to alleviate suffering.57 
Eisenhower, like George Kennan, believed that America's 
greatest strength was in its democratic institutions and its 
economic power and that Communism's greatest ally was 
poverty. As he wrote in his wartime memoris: "Discontent 
can be fanned into revolution, and revolution into social 
chaos. The sequel is dictatorial rule."58
Eisenhower also recognized the connection between 
education and national security. He felt strongly that the 
greatest strength of the United States lay in the vitality 
of its democratic institutions. To Eisenhower college 
students and university faculties represented a great wealth 
of intellectual power which could be used to generate a 
greater appreciation for the blessings of democracy and free
56Address before the American Bar Association, St.
Louis, MO, 5 September 1949, Box 193, PF, PPP, DDEL.
S7Allan Taylor, ed., What Eisenhower Thinks (New York: 
Thomas Y. Crowell, 1952), 142.
“Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe. 505.
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enterprise. To further this belief he played a leading part 
in the forming of the American Assembly which sponsored 
community forums and lectures. He viewed the Assembly as 
the "principal success of his time as university 
president.1,59
Defense Policy
Eisenhower envisioned NATO as the key to European 
unification, which he hoped would go beyond military to 
economic and political integration. Unity, teamwork, and 
cooperation also came into play here as well; in this 
instance Eisenhower saw them as the key elements in building 
the political, economic, moral and military power required 
to defend the free world from communist aggression and to 
prevent the United States from becoming isolated in a world 
dominated by nations hostile to American interests and 
values.60
Eisenhower also suspected that the Soviets possessed an 
advantage over the United States in being able to coordinate 
their global policy and strategy without having to build 
support for their policies by appealing to a large number of 
internal factions and constituencies. Only unity and 
teamwork could put democracy on an equal footing with 
communism in the execution of foreign policy. Since the
59Eisenhower, At Ease. 350.
60Davis, "Eisenhower's Worldview," 159.
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United States could not contain the Communist Revolution by 
bringing an end to poverty everywhere, the best remaining 
option was to make the most efficient use of every resource, 
human, material, and moral.61
Eisenhower's involvement with nuclear strategy from 
1946 to 1952 foreshadowed his personal commitment to 
implement a coherent and rational nuclear weapons strategy.
A unified strategy would control inter-service rivalry, 
define the roles of each service in regard to nuclear 
weapons, recognize certain domestic and foreign limitations, 
and establish a relationship between ends and means. As 
Chief of Staff, President of Columbia University and Supreme 
Commander of NATO, Eisenhower came to believe that the most 
important missing element in the nation's political, 
military, and atomic strategy was leadership.62
In a speech to the American Legion convention in New 
York in August 1947 Eisenhower described the "forceful 
imposition of minority dictatorial control" onto critical 
areas. The security of the United States "depends upon the 
existence and growth of a free world." The United States 
must arm itself so that any war would be fought on the 
territory of the "predatory aggressor." The United States 
must be ready to endure the first hard blows of the 
conflict, immediately recover, and then "strike back, to hit
“ Ibid.
“ Ibid., 210.
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harder than he does— to win." Only through genuine 
preparedness could the United States convince a potential 
aggressor that war would result in his exhaustion or 
destruction.63
Personal Beliefs
Eisenhower believed that public office should not be 
sought after, but accepted as a solemn responsibility. He 
refused to affiliate himself with a political party or to 
become involved in politics "except in such exceptional 
circumstances where a duty was clearly indicated."64 Yet 
according to U.S. News and World Report. Eisenhower's speech 
before the American Bar Association on 5 September 1951 
placed him in the Republican Party even before he won its 
nomination for president. In this speech Eisenhower again 
called for a political path down the center, avoiding vested 
interests and increases in the power of the government. He 
depicted the center as the ideal political ground, with the 
government establishing rules to preserve a practical 
equality of opportunity and acting as a balance between the 
forces of the right and the left. He called upon all
63Capitanchik, The Eisenhower Presidency. 44.
64Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary, 10 July 1951, DDEL.
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citizens to see that the government did not interfere with 
Americans' lives more than is necessary.65
Eisenhower accepted the nomination to the presidency 
because he judged it to be "a transcendent duty" from which 
he could not retreat. He never completely shed his distaste 
for partisan politics and remained an ardent follower of the 
"middle way." His idea of teamwork and consensus allowed 
him to maintain good relations with the Democratic majority 
in Congress. He found it ironic that the strongest 
opposition to some of his policies came from his own 
party.66 Partisanship was the antithesis of teamwork and 
the unity that Eisenhower so highly prized.67
The Economy and National Defense
Eisenhower believed that the United States faced an 
internal economic threat from the Soviets as well as an 
external armed threat. He could not foresee the exact 
influence of the atomic bomb upon military forces, but wrote 
"no matter what the nature of these forces, we simply cannot 
afford extravagance. The premiums for safety insurance must
“ "Eisenhower is a Republican," U.S. News and World 
Report. 8 June 1951, 22-3.
“Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary, 7 Feb 1953, DDEL.
“ Ibid., 22 March 1950.
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be paid, but they should be accurately gauged to our 
needs.1168
At the Air University in April 1947, Eisenhower said
that the American way of life could be threatened
from the inside through collapse of the economic system, 
through tremendous inflation of the currency, through 
industrial strife, through a number of things that can 
come about merely from an unbalanced budget."69
Eisenhower wrote on 27 April 1949 to Swede Hazlett that 
"since a democracy must always retain a waiting, 
strategicall [sic] defensive attitude, it is mandatory that 
some middle line be determined between desirable strength 
and unbearable cost."70
The problem of how much military power the nation could
afford before the means of protecting America began to
corrupt the "internal arrangement" of American life was a
constant source of concern to Eisenhower. As he stated in
his diary 22 January 1952,
In time of peace, certain of these controls [censorship, 
price controls, allocation of materials and commodities] 
could possibly be applied in unusual and serious 
circumstances, but only in the event that there are some 
specific self-limiting provisions included so that shrewd 
politicians cannot, through the manufacture of continuous 
emergency, do permanent damage to our system.71
68Capitanchik, The Eisenhower Presidency. 44.
69Speech at the Air university, Maxwell Field, Alabama, 
8 April 1947, Box 192, PF, PPP, DDEL.
70Griffith, Ike's Letters To A Friend. 54.
71Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary, 2 January 1952, DDEL.
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For Eisenhower the problem was how to maintain a large 
armed force without breaking the American economy. He 
proposed one solution to Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson 
in July 1950: pay a draftee only nominal pay ("nothing more 
than cigarette money") and maintain a skeleton cadre who 
would be remunerated along professional lines.72
Eisenhower believed in a strong and united America with 
unified armed forces. To him, "every consideration of 
efficiency, economy and progress in research demands the 
closest possible unity among all our fighting forces, all 
the way from the bottom to the top."73 He testified before 
the Senate Armed Services Committee that he had concluded 
that a unified field command was a vital factor in a speedy 
and decisive victory in war. Eisenhower believed that if 
the United States had attempted to fight World War II using 
the theories and practices of World War I victory would have 
been delayed, with untold and wasteful losses in men, money 
and resources. He wholeheartedly supported President 
Truman's plan to designate a single civilian head of the 
armed forces.74
72Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Secretary of 
Defense Louis Johnson, Correspondence, 31 July 1950, Box 
110, Louis Johnson Papers, Alderman Library, University of 
Virginia, Charlottesville, VA.
73Speech at American Legion Convention, Chicago, II, 20 
November 1945, Box 192, PF, PPP, DDEL.
74Testimony before the Armed Services Committee, United 
States Senate, on a Bill Proposing "The National Security 
Act of 1947", 25 March 1947, Box 192, PF, PPP, DDEL.
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International Outlook
Dwight D. Eisenhower came to the presidency with a 
unique blend of military, diplomatic and foreign policy 
experience. He brought with him an understanding that total 
war in an atomic age as an instrument of policy was 
unthinkable, that an alternative to war had to be found, and 
that only a system of international alliances could provide 
buffers against Soviet intransigence and expansionism.75
Eisenhower spoke about peace, promoted it and believed 
in peaceful co-existence with adversaries, but he saw peace 
as a direct result of military, economic, and spiritual 
strength. Military strength preserved democracy; economic 
strength preserved free trade and its open markets; and 
spiritual strength preserved freedom of belief and 
worship.76
Eisenhower thought it particularly important to provide 
the public the truth about basic factors, especially the 
economic dependence of the United States upon other regions 
and other nations for certain types of indispensable 
materials. In December 1950, he wrote to General Lawton 
Collins that the public also needed to know the great 
advantage that would accrue to the Communists if they 
successfully invaded Western Europe. Eisenhower pointed out 
the strength that was implicit in unity and the need for
75Medhurst, DDE: Strategic Communicator. 71.
76Ibid., 86.
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establishing priorities in essential tasks, since the 
strength of the United States could not "carry on her back 
all the rest of the world." He went on to describe to 
General Collins the relationship between national security 
and the "problems at home of preparation, maintenance, 
taxes, use of manpower, and production and so on."77
Prepresidential Positions
Eisenhower's prepresidential thinking on the four 
specific issues of internationalism, unity, atomic weapons, 
and the economy were clear. "Intelligent people are not 
isolationists." "A nation's security in war and peace 
demands participation in the community of nations." In 
regard to the atomic bomb, "every invention of mankind has 
been capable of two uses, good and evil. It is up to 
mankind to decide to which use an invention is put. But I 
do not believe we should bury our heads in the sand." Of 
the need to help people recover from the war he said "It is 
possible, even probable, that hopelessness among a people 
can be a far more potent cause of war than greed."78
Foreign policy was clearly Eisenhower's first priority. 
His commitment to internationalist principles was the 
driving force behind his decision to seek the presidency,
77Letter to Lt. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Deputy Chief of 
Staff, Department of the Army, 30 December 1950, Box 25, PF, 
PPP, DDEL.
78Taylor, What Eisenhower Thinks. 127.
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and it remained the logical justification behind many of his 
policies. His brand of internationalism combined the 
dominant view of containment held by the foreign policy 
establishment in Washington with his own geopolitical 
outlook.79 This outlook and his ideas on foreign policy 
grew out of his belief in the efficacy of his own personal 
creed of "Americanism." This creed essentially posited 
freedom as the main product of cooperation among people of 
good will who sought to protect themselves from a common 
danger or to achieve a common good.80
Eisenhower saw internationalism as a counter to the 
advance of communism. As he said in June 1945 in a speech 
in Kansas City, "the problems of Europe and the world are 
our problems, whether we like it or not." In July 1946 in 
an address at Amherst College before the American Alumni 
Council Eisenhower declared "Every nation is neighbor to all 
mankind. The need for international teamwork is no less than 
for that among ourselves." In 1946 he said "a nation's 
success in war and in peace demands participation in the 
community of nations. . . . More than this, no nation can. .
79Richard Melanson, "The Foundations of Eisenhower's 
Foreign Policy: Continuity, Community, and Consensus," in 
Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 
Fifties, eds. Richard A. Melanson and David Mayers,
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 31.
80Taylor, What Eisenhower Thinks. 127.
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. . attain by itself even physical security.81 In his last 
remarks as Army Chief of Staff he reiterated that he firmly 
believed:
the only prescription for absolute security for any 
nation. . .is international understanding and 
cooperation. A shining example is the international 
boundary between us and our neighbors, north and 
south— .But we must face the hard fact that, during the 
two years since the war, the cooperative spirit has lost 
ground. The world comprises two great camps, grouped on 
the one side around dictatorships which subject the 
individual to absolute control and, on the other, 
democracy which provides him a free and unlimited 
horizon....We must so gird ourselves that a predatory 
aggressor will be aware of the risks he runs, should he 
provoke war, it will likely be fought over his 
territory.82
Eisenhower believed in the truth of Franklin's words: 
"We must all hang together, or we shall assuredly hang 
separately." For him this truth was sharply underlined on 
the international scene "where the future of the democracies 
is dependent on their willingness to recognize their 
community of interests, to assist each other to live by 
their common faith in the wisdom of cooperative effort."83 
On 1 February 1951, Eisenhower again said to an informal 
joint session of Congress: "standing alone and isolated in a 
world otherwise completely dominated by communism, our
814th of July Address, Vicksburg, Mississippi, 4 July 
1946, Box 192, PF, PPP, DDEL.
82Speech at American Legion Convention, New York, NY,
29 August 1947, Box 192, PF, PPP, DDEL.
83Speech Accepting the "Poor Richard Club Gold Medal of 
Achievement", Philadelphia, PA, 17 January 1948, Box 192, 
PF, PPP, DDEL.
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system would have to wither away. We would suffer economic 
atrophy and then finally collapse."84
The United Nations was the means for nations to get 
along with one another. In his address at the State Fair at 
Lincoln, Nebraska in September 1946, he compared the United 
Nations to the Midwestern neighborhoods of his youth. "The 
increase of the quality of neighborliness among nations is 
as essential to national security as is an adequate 
defense.1,85
These beliefs in internationalism were further 
developed by his membership from January 1949 to December 
1950 in a Council on Foreign Relations Group that studied 
the military and political implications of the Marshall 
Plan. The council's members supported an internationalist 
and an anti-isolationist position toward foreign affairs. 
Eisenhower was sympathetic to the philosophy of the council 
and agreed to lead the study group. Believing that the 
United States had committed a grave error by refraining from 
joining the League of Nations after World war I, the Group 
argued that NATO should be only one of a whole system of 
American worldwide military alliances. The study group not 
only contributed to the economic and foreign policy 
knowledge of the future president, but it also continued to
84Taylor, What Eisenhower Thinks. 127.
85Address at the State Fair, Lincoln, NE, n.d.
September 1946, Box 192, PF, PPP, DDEL.
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expose him to the thinking of an elite body of 
internationalists who directly influenced the conduct of 
foreign affairs. Indeed, the Foreign Relations Council 
itself had grown into a renowned forum for high-level, 
expert discussions on international matters.86
After World War II Eisenhower participated in the major 
decisions and actions that made up American foreign policy. 
He approved of Truman's initial decision to continue 
Roosevelt's policy of attempting to get along with the 
Soviets. When successive stages of disillusionment required 
acceptance of the fact that only a determined stand against 
Soviet intransigence would cope with Soviet imperialism, 
Eisenhower returned to active service and spurred on the 
defensive efforts of the Western allies.87
However, Eisenhower did not abandon the hope of 
negotiating with the Soviets because of three elements from 
his past. The first was his service with the Control 
Council in Berlin in 1945-46 which left him with a different 
impression of the Soviet officials than he had expected; he 
had even struck up a warm friendship with Soviet Marshall 
Grigori Zhukov during a conference in Berlin.88 The second
86Michael Wala, "An 'Education in Foreign Affairs for 
the Future President': the Council on Foreign Relations and 
Dwight D. Eisenhower" in Reexamining the Eisenhower 
Presidency, ed. Shirley Anne Warshaw, (London: Greenwood 
Press, 1993), 2-11.
87Taylor, What Eisenhower Thinks. 128.
88Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President. 217.
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element was his realistic appreciation for the destructive 
potential of nuclear weapons as compared with the 
conventional weapons of World War II. For Eisenhower, this 
made war not only irrational, but also unthinkable. The 
third factor was his commitment to a major reduction in 
defense expenditures.89
On 21 June 1951 while assigned as commander of Supreme 
Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Eisenhower 
described for Swede Hazlett his insistence on a system of 
collective security in which he saw Europe providing in the 
long run for its own defense. The United States would help 
the Europeans produce arms and units for its own defense, 
with the United States providing psychological, intellectual 
and material leadership.90 On 4 September 1951 Eisenhower 
outlined a requirement for a "broad and intelligent program 
of loans, trade, technical assistance and mutual guarantees 
of security."91
Unless we are careful to build up and to maintain a great 
group of international friends ready to trade with us, 
where do we hope to get the materials that we will one 
day need as our rate of consumption continues and 
accelerates?92
Eisenhower's internationalist position was reflected in 
his choice of business and social associates. Between 1945
89Capitanchik, The Eisenhower Presidency. 56.
9CGriffith, Ike's Letters To A Friend. 85.
91Ibid., 166.
92Ibid., 167.
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and 1952, almost without exception Eisenhower's business 
companions were internationalists, who advocated an expanded 
global political, economic and military role for the United 
States, and conservatives who desired to rein in the growing 
power and activism of the state. His own version of 
patriotic nationalism and his distaste for divisive class 
and partisan warfare blended well with their convictions.
He would increasingly call upon them for counsel and 
political support.93
Attorney General Herbert Brownell later wrote that 
Eisenhower's entire career prepared him for the presidency. 
He had developed a detailed knowledge of the Far East under 
MacArthur; he developed the Army budget and presented it to 
Congress. He had learned the relationship between the 
Pentagon budget and the general economic welfare of the 
United States. Eisenhower knew on a first name basis most 
of the leaders of the legislative branch who carried over 
into his own administration. Eisenhower, moreover, had 
helped develop postwar policy toward Europe. As a 
presidential candidate, he was not handicapped by a 
strong partisan background, nor was he brought up in 
the log-rolling atmosphere of Congress or in any State 
House.94
93Burk, DDE: Hero and Politician. 102-103.
94Thompson, Eleven Intimate Perspectives. 165-6.
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Summary
Eisenhower brought to the presidency certain intangible 
but crucial assets. A lifetime soldier, he was no 
militarist. The leader of a victorious coalition in the 
greatest war in history, he was genuinely a man of peace.
His own high rank and long military experience made it 
impossible for the Pentagon brass to overshadow him; he 
handled them as no big business man, corporate executive or 
politician could. He had justifiable confidence in his one 
great gift— a gift of getting along with people, of solving 
and smoothing over organizational problems. Though his 
faith in the idea that he could sit down and talk with 
Soviet leaders reflected an overestimation of his skills in 
dealing with people, it indicated a willingness to assume 
that there were human beings with similar problems on the 
other side. For the first time since FDR, America had a 
leader who was not afraid to negotiate.95
In foreign affairs, Eisenhower believed that he was the 
only person who could continue the national consensus 
established by Roosevelt on domestic and foreign policy. 
American involvement in Korea endangered this consensus as 
the war became the chief symbol of an increasingly 
frustrating Cold War.96 He accepted the support of the
95I.F. Stone, The Haunted Fifties (Boston, Little,
Brown, 1963), 105.
"Capitanchik, The Eisenhower Presidency. 16.
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Republican Party's internationalist wing in a contest 
against Senator Robert A. Taft, the favorite of the 
isolationist wing. The more moderate Republicans interested 
in preserving the foreign policy consensus convinced him 
that he would be carrying out his NATO assignment in a 
different way, since only he could forestall the nomination 
of Senator Taft and the coming to power of his neo­
isolationist backers. Eisenhower also saw his role as 
president as the continuation of his roles at SHAEF and at 
NATO as the great unifier and as the leader of the Western 
democracies in war and peace.97
The American public identified Eisenhower as a 
successful military leader, a common, down-to-earth 
individual, and a humble, non-political man. This picture 
merged with that of the peaceful warrior and duty-bound 
seeker of consensus. He became a hero because he was one; 
he became a hero because he was not a warrior or a pacifist, 
a leader or a common man, a candidate or a or a politician, 
but because he was all of these things. He offered an 
insecure people experience, strength, and confidence.98
General Eisenhower approached the presidency of 
Columbia University in June 1947, his appointment as NATO 
commander in December 1950, and his drive for the Republican
97Ibid., 17.
"Richard E. Crable, "Ike: Identification, Argument, 
and Paradoxical Appeal," Quarterly Journal of Speech 63 
(1977), 195.
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presidential nomination in January 1952 in the same manner. 
He had been called to duty; his position was clear: he 
expected full support and he would continue to keep his 
options open. He had convinced himself that "acceptance was 
a duty."99
"Travis Beal Jacobs, "Eisenhower, the American 
Assembly, and the 1952 Elections," in Warshaw, Reexamining 
the Eisenhower Presidency. 18-19.
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CHAPTER 5 
FROM A LONG TELEGRAM TO A NEW LOOK 
The previous chapters in this study examined the pre- 
presidential dispositions of both Harry S. Truman and Dwight 
D. Eisenhower. This chapter will consider the impact of 
their character traits, personal beliefs and backgrounds on 
the foreign policy and national security problems of their 
respective administrations. Each man faced the same 
essential dilemma: how to counter the Soviet threat while 
meeting the domestic and political demands of his era. Each 
president modified the foreign policy of his predecessor in 
order to meet the demands of the unique situation 
confronting his administration. The major documents which 
resulted from the presidential reviews of national security 
and foreign policy, Truman's NSC 68 and Eisenhower’s NSC 
162, show how each president altered foreign and national 
security policy to meet the demands of his philosophy during 
his time in the arena.
President Harry S. Truman 
During World War II President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
minimized disagreements between the United States and the 
Soviet Union and emphasized cooperation. Roosevelt was
98
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convinced that his primary obligation was to focus the 
attention of the American people upon winning the war and to 
avoid controversies which might jeopardize national unity.1 
Roosevelt wanted to keep the Soviets involved in the war 
effort and to prevent a negotiated peace at the war’s end 
which might replicate the problems which had followed World 
War I. Roosevelt dispatched a personal emissary, W. Averell 
Harriman, to the Soviet Union soon after it entered the war 
to resolve some early misunderstandings.2
During the war itself Roosevelt implemented a strategy 
of co-opting the Soviets by involving them in a series of 
conferences and in the development of an organization to 
maintain peace in the post-war world. Roosevelt believed 
that these joint planning activities would build a 
cooperative relationship between the two powers, would 
assure the Soviets of security and acceptability in the 
international arena, and would place moral pressures on the 
Soviets to live by the rules of the organization which they 
helped to create.3 This strategy of co-opting the Soviets 
also involved postponing discussion of any issues which 
might be potentially divisive.
Sumner Welles, Where Are We Heading? (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1946), 18.
2W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to 
Churchill and Stalin (New York: Random House, 1975), 268.
3Richard M. Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the 
Origins of McCarthvism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972),
38.
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Divisions eventually surfaced, however, and President 
Roosevelt's last days in office were marked by almost open 
disagreements with the Soviets. The question was whether 
these disagreements would become permanent after the war. 
President Harry S Truman, realizing the importance of 
domestic political considerations and desirous of continuing 
Roosevelt's co-operative policies, did not rush into a 
protracted confrontation with the Soviets while he and his 
country were preoccupied with demobilization and returning 
the nation to peacetime.4 As president, Truman would 
frequently rely upon his reservoir of historical knowledge 
as a guide to action in areas in which he had little 
experience, such as foreign affairs. He saw the 1940s as a 
potential replay of the 1930s - depression, aggression, 
totalitarianism, and war.5 For Truman the 1930s taught a 
plain and unmistakable lesson: appeasement did not eliminate 
the possibility of war. Other periods taught similar 
lessons. The withdrawal of American troops from Korea in 
1949 suggested to Truman the eagerness of his Southern 
ancestors for the end of Reconstruction. The 1950 North 
Korean invasion of South Korea brought to Truman's mind not 
only America's rescue of the Allies in 1917, but also 
Washington's recovery in Valley Forge.6
4Ferrell, "HST: A Chance President," 160.
5Paterson, On Every Front. 128.
6May, "Lessons" of the Past. 80.
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But which analogy provided the best guide for relations 
with the USSR? Truman's advisors urged the president to be 
as firm as possible in his dealings with the Soviets. 
Ambassador W. Averell Harriman was convinced that the United 
States should indicate its displeasure in ways that affected 
the Soviet interest in each case in which they failed to 
take the interests of the United States into 
consideration.7 The State Department agreed, writing that 
the United States should make it "patently clear" that 
cooperation and aid depended on the Soviet1s conformity to 
the principles agreed upon at the Moscow and Teheran 
Conferences and that "firmness, friendliness and positive 
action" may be able to make them drop "at least the most 
odious methods of interference in the internal affairs of 
other countries."8
President Truman, who most admired the tough, plain- 
speaking leaders of America's past, implemented this advice 
when he met with V. I. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, 
on 22 and 23 April 22 1945. This meeting had been arranged 
to demonstrate the continued cooperative spirit between the 
two governments and to reduce the disturbances which had 
been caused by the death of President Roosevelt.9 Mr.
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behind President Roosevelt's commitments and agreements and 
brought the Soviets to task for not carrying out their 
portion of the agreement made in the Crimea. Truman 
believed that the agreements made at Yalta for free 
elections were in fact contracts and resolved to hold the 
Soviets to their word. According to Charles E. Bohlen, 
Assistant to the Secretary of State, Mr Truman declared 
"with great firmness" that the Soviets had reached an 
agreement on Poland and that it only remained for Marshall 
Stalin to carry it out in accordance with his word.10 When 
Molotov complained of his treatment, Truman countered,
"Carry out your agreements and you won't get talked to like 
that."11 President Truman was getting tough with the 
Soviets just as Senator Truman had gotten tough with 
contractors and government agencies who had failed to live 
up to agreements. This firm, judicial tone, reflecting 
Truman's belief in the sanctity of previously made 
agreements and the necessity of keeping one's word, made it 
known to the Soviets that United States-Soviet relations 
were now to be conducted in a different manner.
President Truman had his first meeting with Stalin at 
the Potsdam Conference and was to come away from it 
convinced that "force is the only thing the Russians
10Ibid., 257.
“Maddox, From War to Cold War. 55.
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understand."12 The conference settled some issues, but the 
chief significance for Truman was the opportunity to meet 
with Stalin and the Soviets and to see what the West had to 
face in the future. Events of the succeeding months, which 
saw continuing disagreements between the two countries, only 
reinforced Truman's belief that a more confrontational 
policy was necessary.
At the same time, policy makers in the State Department 
perceived that Eastern Europe was coming more and more under 
the influence of the Soviets. Harriman viewed the Soviets' 
plans to establish satellite states in the region as a 
threat to the world and the United States.13 Recent Soviet 
successes in the Balkans, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania 
seemed to be aimed at the Mediterranean and the oil-rich 
Middle East. Truman's foreign policy planners saw only 
Greece, Turkey and Iran separating the Soviets from these 
resources. United States' planners also knew that each of 
these nations was extremely susceptible to the Soviet 
tactics of subversion and espionage.14
In his first State of the Union Address on 21 January 
1946, President Truman declared that his postwar foreign 
policy sought to build a peace based on the tenets of
12Truman, Memoirs. 1:412.
13FRUS, 1945 5:843.
14Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York: The 
Viking Press, 1955), 68.
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understanding and justice. This was not a break with the 
policies of the Roosevelt administration, nor was it a new 
policy. Clearly Truman, always the centrist, had grasped 
the political mean between repudiation and accommodation. 
Truman's rather understated position was followed in 
February by Stalin's political address to the Supreme Soviet 
in which he defined Communist postwar goals and strategies 
for the Soviet Union. For Stalin there could be no long- 
range cooperation between communism and capitalism. The war 
itself had been the result of convulsions in the capitalist 
system. As a pro forma candidate for election to the 
Supreme Soviet, Stalin declared that the world revolution 
would continue and that the Soviet Union would embark on a 
series of five-year plans to press on with the revolutionary 
program.15
Stalin's speech was at first greeted with little 
surprise and without much concern by Secretary of State 
James F. Byrnes who had, at the Moscow meetings in October 
1945, continued to look for common ground between the United 
States and the Soviet Union.16 Truman's other advisors who 
had consistently argued for a harder line vis-a-vis the 
Soviets had a different reaction. The speech convinced 
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal that there was no way
15New York Times. 10 February 1946, 4:24.
“Phillips, The Truman Presidency. 258.
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in which democracy and communism could co-exist.17 
Ambassador Averell Harriman also saw Stalin's words as the 
emergence of a hard, new party line that proved the futility 
of counting upon Soviet cooperation in settling the 
political affairs of postwar Europe.18 Undersecretary of 
State Dean Acheson viewed the speech as an affirmation of a 
Soviet offensive against the West which Stalin had started 
in Poland in 1945.19 Later Secretary Byrnes himself was to 
use Stalin's words in his own speeches calling for a firmer 
attitude toward the Soviets.20
In February 1946 George Kennan, the charge d'affaires 
in Moscow, in response to a Washington query, described the 
expansionist intentions of the Soviet Union in his now 
famous "Long Telegram."21 Kennan, the State Department's 
foremost Soviet expert, warned that the Soviet Union 
constituted a political force "committed fanatically" to the 
belief that there could be no modus vivendi with the United 
States. The Soviets believed that they had to destroy the 
internal harmony and stability of the United States and that
17Walter Millis and E.S. Duffield, eds., The Forrestal 
Diaries (New York: Viking, 1951), 135.
18Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and 
Stalin. 547.
19Acheson, Present At The Creation. 194.
20James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1947), 255.
21FRUS. 1946 6:696-709.
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they had to break its international authority.22 Kennan 
predicted that the Soviets would use every possible means to 
infiltrate, divide and weaken the West. Seeking a modus 
vivendi with the Soviets would only lead to political 
warfare. Later in March Kennan characterized the belief, 
held by some prominent Americans, that Soviet suspicions of 
the formation of an anti-Soviet bloc could be ameliorated as 
a serious misunderstanding about Soviet realities. This 
constituted the "most insidious and dangerous single error 
Americans could make thinking about by the Soviet Union."23
President Truman had been inching to the same position, 
complaining to Secretary Byrnes on 5 January 1946 that "I'm 
tired of babying the Soviets."24 Truman and the foreign 
policy establishment seized upon Kennan's message. The 
United States at large slowly responded to Kennan's 
recommendations.25 Truman1s approach was later dubbed the 
strategy of containment after Kennan's recommendation that 
the growth of Soviet influence had to be contained.
Later during 1946, controversies over Soviet activities 
in Iran, Greece and Turkey broke out between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. The Soviets, attempting to 
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a revolutionary government in the northern Iranian province 
of Azerbaijan. In Turkey Stalin demanded the return of 
three border provinces which Russia had lost after World War 
I. He also demanded bases on the Dardanelles and in Greek 
Thrace and the revision of the international convention 
which governed passage of ships through the Black Sea 
Straits. The War Department characterized these activities 
and incidents as evidence of the determination of the 
Soviets to dominate the eastern Mediterranean. In June the 
Soviet Union launched a propaganda offensive against the 
United States to convince the world that the United States 
had deserted Roosevelt's foreign policy in favor of a 
militarist, imperialist and expansionist foreign policy.26
In August 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed 
their concern over the world situation. If the Soviets 
succeeded in dominating Turkey and controlling the Turkish 
Straits, the military situation in the Middle East and the 
Eastern Mediterranean could become untenable for the other 
nations. The Joint Chiefs saw a calculated Soviet policy of 
expanding Soviet "de facto geographical and political 
control.1127
Signs of increased Communist assistance to Greek 
leftists continued to appear and, in the eyes of the West, 
continued to threaten the stability of that country. In
26FRUS. 1946 6:768-69.
27FRUS, 1946 7:857-8.
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October 1946, the American Military Attache in Greece, 
Lieutenant Colonel Alan C. Miller reported that "movement of 
Left Wing bands across the frontier is given the tacit 
approval of Yugoslav and Albanian authorities.1,28 The 
State Department believed that "there can be no question 
that the U.S.S.R. is providing military assistance to 
elements seeking to cause the fall of the Greek 
Government."29 A 1947 United Nations Security Council 
investigation confirmed suspicions that Albania, Bulgaria 
and Yugoslavia had previously supported guerrilla warfare in 
Greece in 1945 and 1946.30 Great Britain meanwhile was 
becoming increasingly concerned over her ability to maintain 
financial support of the beleaguered Greeks.31 Truman with 
his historical perspective must have seen all of this as a 
variation of the totalitarian aggression of the 1930s.
Meanwhile foreign affairs appeared to be of little 
concern to the Republicans. In a radio address on 3 January 
1947, Senator Taft, a leading isolationist, devoted only 
three paragraphs to foreign affairs. In these paragraphs he 
specifically predicted congressional resistance to foreign 
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Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a 
convert to internationalism, promised not only continued 
support of the Administration's foreign policy program, but 
also close examination of any proposed legislation dealing 
with international trade and reductions in tariffs.32
Truman would have to battle isolationism again, just as 
he had while a member of the Senate. In addition, 
increasing inflation, high unemployment and an economy 
looking to expand confronted the president. In 1946, the 
consumer price index had increased from 129.6 to 153.3 while 
the wholesale price index rose from 107.1 to 140.9.33 
Truman's background as a county administrator and 
politician, as well as his experience with balanced budgets, 
made it hard for him to justify increased spending on 
assistance to foreign countries while constituents faced 
economic difficulties at home.
Nonetheless, in his State of the Union Address on 6 
January 1947 President Truman remained true to both reform 
and internationalism. He outlined his legislative program, 
warning against the complete dismantling of the New Deal, 
stressing a balanced budget and a large-scale housing 
program. In the area of foreign affairs he expressed his 
confidence that a bipartisan approach to foreign policy
32New York Times. 20 January 1947, 1.
33Susan Hartman, Truman and the 80th Congress 
(Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1971), 4.
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would continue, and he advocated the same free trade 
position he had embraced as a senator.34
Six weeks later Great Britain officially notified the 
United States that she would pull out of Greece by 1 April 
1947. Recent dispatches from Greece stressed the urgency of 
the situation: Greece needed substantial aid quickly if the 
communist rebels were not to take her over. If the West 
lost Greece, then Turkey's position would become 
untenable.35
President Truman decided that the United States had 
only one real alternative in the matter. If Greece and 
Turkey were to fall under the control of the Soviet Union, 
communist domination threatened freedom and liberty 
throughout the world. Realizing that he faced a Republican- 
controlled Congress and fearing a revival of isolationism, 
Truman determined to use the spirit of bipartisan support of 
foreign policy which Senator Vandenberg had pledged in 
January to support aid to Greece.
On the morning of February 27, President Truman held a 
meeting with Senators Styles Bridges, Arthur Vandenberg, 
Alben Barkley and Tom Connally and Congressmen Joseph 
Martin, Charles Eaton, Sol Bloom and Sam Rayburn. Truman
34U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of 
the United States. (Washington, D.C.: Offce of the Federal 
Register. National Archives and records Service, 1963),
Harry S. Truman, 1947, 9-12. (Hereafter cited as Public 
Papers. Truman.)
35FRUS, 1947 5:56.
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explained to them the position in which the British 
withdrawal had placed the United States. Secretary of State 
George C. Marshall reviewed the details of the situation and 
made it clear that the United States faced the choice of 
taking action to prevent a communist takeover in Greece or 
losing Greece and Turkey by doing nothing.36 After Dean 
Acheson made an impassioned plea for congressional support, 
to the effect that the United States had arrived at a 
position "without parallel since ancient history," the 
leading legislators finally appreciated the threat.37 
Senator Vandenberg urged the president to make a personal 
appearance before Congress and "scare hell" out of the 
country. "If you will say that to the Congress and the 
country, I will support you and I believe that most of the 
members will do the same."38
At one o'clock in the afternoon on Wednesday, 12 March
1947 President Truman addressed a joint session of Congress
on what he described as an extremely critical situation. As
recalled by Eben A. Ayers39,
the President went before Congress at one o'clock today 
and delivered. . . an address calling for $400 million to 
be provided for aid to Greece and for authority to 
furnish civilian and military personnel. The great 
importance and significance of the speech lies less in
36Jones, The Fifteen Weeks. 139.
37Ibid., 142.
38Acheson, Present At The Creation. 219.
39Eben A. Ayers was Truman's Assistant Press Secretary.
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the recommendations than in the break which it marks in 
U. S. foreign policy and in its attack upon the communist 
policy of political infiltration in foreign countries and 
its sharp and clear references to Russia. The president 
did not name "Russia" or the Soviets at any point but his 
words were clear. They marked the end of appeasement of 
Russia.40
The president, without mentioning the Soviet Union, 
referred to the struggle between two systems of government, 
one advocating self-determination and the other advocating 
totalitarian rule. He saw Greece and Turkey standing in the 
front line of the democracies; their fall would be 
devastating to the cause of freedom. "I believe that it 
must be the policy of the United States to support free 
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed 
minorities or by outside pressures."41
The president's address initially met with immediate 
criticism from a broad spectrum of public opinion.
Columnist Walter Lippman wrote that the United States was 
not rich enough or strong enough to subsidize reaction to 
communist advances all over the world. Liberals were 
especially hostile as they saw the address as an invitation 
to war. Public opinion polls revealed that 56% of the 
public favored aid to Greece, but only 45% favored sending 
military advisors or bypassing the United Nations. Bernard
40Eben A. Ayers, Truman In The White House (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 1991), 170.
41Public Papers. Truman. 176-179.
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Baruch noted that the address was almost a declaration of 
ideological war.42
The New Republic maintained that the United States 
would justify its use of a system of unholy alliances on the 
basis that the end justified the means. President Truman 
has "summoned in a century of fear."43 The immediate 
effect was to divide Europe into "irreconcilable camps of 
good and evil" and to establish the United States as the 
guardian of the status quo.44 A positive reaction to the 
speech was evident, however. The New York Times declared on 
12 March 1947 that a new chapter in foreign policy more 
appropriate to the position of the United States was being 
opened, and that the "epoch of isolation and occasional 
intervention is ended" and is "being replaced by an epoch of 
responsibility."45 On the 13th the New York Times would 
follow up by stating that it believed that "there can be no 
doubt that the American people stand behind this 
warning."46 President Truman in his Memoirs wrote that it 
was a turning point in American foreign policy.47
42New Republic. 31 March 1947, 5.
43Ibid., 24 March 1947, 13.
44Public Papers. Truman. 176-79.
45New York Times. 12 March 1947.
46Ibid, 13 March 1947.
47Truman, Memoirs; Years of Trial and Hope. 230.
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Deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union caused 
two strains of opinion to develop about the long term 
response of the United States. These strains mirrored 
Truman's own struggle with the primacy of strength and 
preparedness versus the importance of economic development 
in world affairs. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal 
recommended a stronger national defense to thwart an armed 
confrontation with the Soviets. Secretary of State George 
C. Marshall, on the other hand, favored concentrating on the 
problems of Europe's economic recovery. Forrestal saw the 
United States's monopoly of the atomic bomb as the key to 
its postwar security, while Marshall saw the restoration of 
the European balance of power as the guarantor of American 
security.48
Indeed, in June 1947 President Truman attempted to 
satisfy both sets of demands by launching the European 
Recovery Plan, better known as the Marshall Plan, shortly 
after the Truman Doctrine was announced to counter a shift 
in the correlation of power from the United States towards 
the Soviet Union. These measures were followed by the 
National Defense Act of 1947. This act created a host of 
new agencies, including the National Security Council (NSC) 
and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). While these 
agencies reflected Truman's sense of efficiency and order,
4BSteven L. Rearden, The Evolution of American 
Strategic Doctrine: Paul H. Nitze and the Soviet Challenge 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 9-10.
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the newly created Department of Defense (DOD) demonstrated 
the President's thoughts on unifying the military services 
to reduce duplication and division of authority.
Additionally the creation of the NSC unified and integrated 
defense and foreign policy, matching military capabilities 
with diplomatic commitments, and reconciling national 
security requirements with the needs of the domestic 
economy.49 The creation of the NSC reflects Truman’s 
desire to overcome the inadequacies of initial planning and 
the delay in determining basic policy he had seen in the 
Executive Branch as a senator.
Yet the influence of the Soviet Union and its ability 
to threaten the West continued. More ominously, in 
September 1949 an Air Force intelligence aircraft brought 
back evidence that the Soviet Union had successfully 
detonated an atomic device.50 President Truman had 
previously decided that balancing the budget was his primary 
concern in the face of postwar inflation and a swollen 
budget. While he authorized a request for a $3 billion 
supplemental military appropriation for Fiscal Year 1949, 
Truman's budgets gave priority to domestic obligations and 
left the remainder to the Department of Defense in keeping 
with his belief that large defense expenditures would
49Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. 176.
50Rearden, The Evolution of Strategic Doctrine. 14.
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bankrupt the nation.51 In early December 1948 Truman 
approved a defense budget of $14.4 billion for FY 1950. 
Secretary Forrestall and the Joint Chiefs, unable to 
convince Truman of the need for additional resources, argued 
that only nuclear weapons would combine a frugal approach to 
defense expenditures with a credible military stance.
Before committing himself to this program Truman 
ordered his secretaries of State and Defense to "undertake a 
re-examination of our objectives in peace and war and of the 
effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, in light
of the probable fission bomb capability and possible
thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union."52 This 
review would result in a significant change in the United 
States' policy of containment.
United States officials, operating under the philosophy 
of the "Long Telegram," had previously seen the chief threat
to the balance of power as political and economic, not
military; wartime devastation and natural calamities had so 
disrupted life in Europe that Communist parties in France, 
Italy, Greece and elsewhere were thought to have excellent 
opportunities of coming to power through coups or even 
through free elections. United States policy from 1947 to 
1949 attempted to revive faith in democratic institutions 
and procedures in order to preempt further expansion by
51Ibid., 11.
52FRUS, 1950 1:141-42.
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communist parties. However, fears of inflation and the 
effect of unbalanced budgets limited the primary application 
of American power to Europe while attempts were made to 
minimize involvement in other areas like China and 
Palestine.53
The Administration had relied on its monopoly of atomic 
weapons to keep the defense budget under $15 billion while 
it countered Soviet advances with economic aid. The 
administration had assumed that the threat to use atomic 
weapons would be sufficient to keep the Soviets from 
overrunning Western Europe. News that the Soviets had 
detonated their own bomb in August 1949 signalled that the 
United States atomic deterrent would not last. Truman's 
contemplation of the development of the hydrogen bomb was an 
attempt to regain nuclear superiority in order to avoid 
having to match Soviet troop levels in Europe. Economic aid 
without military involvement would no longer suffice to 
contain Soviet advances.54 Moreover, the decision required 
a general examination of the country's "strategic plans and 
its objectives in peace and war."55
On 12 April 1950 Truman referred the results of this 
policy review by the Departments of State and Defense
53John Lewis Gaddis, "Was The Truman Doctrine A Real 
Turning Point?" Foreign Affairs 53 (January 1974), 391-2.
54Ibid., 393-4.
55FRUS, 1950 1:236.
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Department to the National Security Council for 
consideration and a determination of its implications. The 
final document, NSC 68, was to provide the basis for 
increasing the defense budget, and the producing and 
stockpiling thermonuclear weapons.56
This improvement of the country's defenses under NSC 68 
was aimed at achieving the fundamental objective of assuring 
the survival of the United States under a non-totalitarian 
form of government. The chief function served by NSC 68 was 
to give the national defense a claim on resources equal to 
or greater than that of all other competing government 
programs. This was a complete break with the past policy 
and was necessitated by the administration's understanding 
of the Soviet threat and the role of the United States as 
world leader.57
The justification for higher defense expenditures was 
needed as Truman Administration planners had became 
increasingly concerned over the strategic implications of 
the Soviet atomic bomb. NSC 68 was the nation's first 
formal statement of national security policy. It assumed 
that the Soviets aspired to worldwide hegemony, did not rule 
out the possibility of war, and showed how a global policy
56John M. Siracusa, "NSC 68: A Reappraisal," Naval War 
College Review 33 (June 1980), 4-5.
57Rearden, The Evolution of Strategic Doctrine. 34.
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of resisting communism could be implemented without 
bankrupting the United States.58
NSC 68 estimated that the U.S.S.R. would attain a first 
strike capability which could seriously damage vital centers 
in the United States by 1954, unless faced by a more 
effective level of opposition.59 The paper contained four 
possible courses of action, the first of which was staying 
the present course and continuing present policies. The 
other three courses included a return to isolation, a 
preventive war and a rapid buildup of political, economic, 
and military strength in the Free World. The Truman 
Administration chose the fourth course of action and placed 
the United States firmly on the road of active military 
opposition to Soviet military advances.60
NSC 68 asserted that the American people would support 
national security demands upon scarce economic and social 
resources where traditionally it had placed domestic needs 
and interests before those of national security. NSC 68 
also ushered in an era in which the United States departed 
from previous practice and maintained sizable military 
forces, placing an increased reliance upon military power as 
an element of foreign policy.61
58Gaddis, "The Truman Doctrine A Turning Point?" 395-6.
59FRUS, 1950 1:251.
60Siracusa, "NSC 68: A Reappraisal," 10-11.
“Rearden, The Evolution of Strategic Doctrine. 4.
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This change in American foreign policy occurred because 
the Truman Administration went beyond the basic tenets of 
Kennan's "Long Telegram," which saw the Soviet threat as one 
chiefly economic and political in nature. Up to this time 
the Truman Administration had counted upon its atomic 
monopoly to counter the Soviet manpower advantage in Europe. 
With the detonation of the Soviet's own atomic bomb, the 
Administration believed a new approach to containment was 
required. Where Kennan assumed that containment of the 
Soviet Union in time would produce internal changes that 
would eventually alter Soviet behavior,62 Truman and his 
advisors now saw an almost interminable military threat from 
an implacable enemy armed with atomic weapons. NSC 68 
described the Cold War as a more or less permanent state of 
relations between the United States and the Soviets.63 NSC 
68 also provided a statement of goals and methods to insure 
that the United States and its allies could withstand the 
Soviet Union.64
NSC 68 reaffirmed the contention of the "Long Telegram" 
that the Soviet Union aspired to global hegemony.65 The 
United States faced an unavoidable conflict with the Soviet
62X, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs 
25 (July 1947): 574-76.
“Rearden, The Evolution of Strategic Doctrine. 21.
64Ibid., 8.
“FRUS, 1946 6:696-709.
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Union, because it opposed the Soviet Union and its objective 
of world domination. NSC 68 also estimated that the Soviet 
Union would have the hydrogen bomb and a delivery means by 
1954, thus significantly offsetting US nuclear capability.
It also ruled out the prospect of arms control and 
negotiations with the Soviet Union from anything except a 
position of strength. NSC 68 finished with a strong call 
for a much greater commitment of United States resources to 
national security in order to overcome the chief limitations 
of American power, a lack of conventional military forces 
and the military and economic weaknesses of Europe.66
When the attack on Korea came a few months later, 
Truman, seeing the events of the 1930s repeating themselves 
in the North Korean invasion of South Korea, rallied the 
United Nations, endorsed NSC 68 and asked the services to 
tell him what they needed from Congress in the way of 
supplemental appropriations. With the country at war and 
almost everyone assuming that the Russians were the puppet- 
masters of the North Koreans, congressmen of both parties 
voted to give the president whatever he asked.67
66Douglas Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy 
Management: A study in Defense Politics (Lexington, KE.: The 
University of Kentucky Press, 1977), 6-7.
67Ernest R. May, "The American Commitment to Germany, 
1949-1955," in American Historians and the Atlantic 
Alliance, ed. Lawrence S. Kaplan, (Kent, OH: The Kent State 
University Press, 1991), 61.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
122
On 30 September 1950, President Truman signed NSC 68 as 
the feeling developed in the administration that the Soviet 
Union was behind the war. The growing unpopularity of the 
war, however, and the expense of the buildup cost Truman and 
his party the White House as the country elected a successor 
who promised to "go to Korea."68
Harry Truman made a difference as President of the 
United States because he brought the clear, simple black- 
and-white view of a judge to bear upon international 
politics. Where Roosevelt put off decisions, Truman 
relished the opportunity to make them just as he had as a 
presiding judge in Jackson County. For Truman the code of 
the politician was at the bottom of personal relations: one 
honored previously made agreements or one was not worthy of 
trust in the future. For a president unskilled in foreign 
affairs, history provided a guide to the future. Truman's 
ancestors taught him that no half-hearted measures would 
suffice in defense of hearth and home. A threat either 
existed at a fairly specific time or one did not exist. 
Moreover, NSC 68 had the appearance of a legal brief to 
obtain a decision from a former county judge.
The Transition from Truman to Eisenhower
By the time Dwight D. Eisenhower succeeded Truman in 
the presidency, the first practitioners of the containment
68Rearden, The Evolution of Strategic Doctrine. 30.
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policy could point to both successes and failures. The 
Soviets had not expanded any further in Europe, but a war, 
supported by both the Soviets and the Chinese Communists, 
was underway in Korea. On 18 November 1952 when Truman and 
his staff briefed General Eisenhower on the state of the 
military and foreign affairs the new administration would 
face, an array of problems greeted the new administration:
- Korea: the achievement of a truce depended upon 
resolving the issue of forcible repatriation of prisoners- 
of-war.
- Iran: the Communists threatened to exploit a crisis 
over Iranian confiscation of British oil properties.
- Indochina: the United States was financially 
supporting a colonialist French government whose policies 
made it impossible to rally the local population to oppose 
communist forces effectively.
- Foreign aid: the question concerned how much aid, how 
should it be allocated between military and economic aid, 
and to whom should it be given.69
When Truman had measured the extent of the Soviet- 
American problem in 1947, he had been able to do it with the 
knowledge of American superiority. He was able to 
counterbalance the Soviet superiority in ground forces with 
the American monopoly in atomic weapons and delivery 
systems. Truman was certain that this approach had
69Rostow. The United States In the World Arena. 263.
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prevented the disintegration of Western Europe and its 
subsequent passage into the Communist sphere and allowed him 
to establish his "Fair Deal" while keeping the Soviets at 
bay. Six years later, however, the Communists had emerged 
as the strongest military power in Asia. Nationalism had 
spread throughout Asia and the Middle East, creating 
problems difficult in their own right, but of great effect 
on the Western Alliance. The United States and the Soviet 
Union now opposed each other with both the weapons of mass 
destruction on the one hand and the techniques of 
propaganda, economic aid and nonmilitary influence on the 
other.70
President Dwight D. Eisenhower
Eisenhower, who came to the presidency with a wealth of 
foreign policy and administrative experience, brought with 
him an understanding that total war in an atomic age was 
unthinkable, that an alternative to war had to found, and 
that only a system of international alliances could provide 
buffers against Soviet intransigence and expansionism.71
Eisenhower saw the re-establishment of fiscal 
responsibility as an essential prerequisite to a sound 
defense. He saw big government as a threat to free 
enterprise and individual endeavor, which his value system
70Ibid., 264.
71Medhurst, DDE; Strategic Communicator. 71.
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regarded as the core elements of American democracy. He 
feared that a constantly expanding military budget would 
eventually lead to an excessive level of federal 
intervention to channel national resources into defense.
The result would be a garrison state in which high taxes, 
monetary restrictions and economic controls would cripple 
private enterprise.72 This concern for the ability of the 
United States to sustain the Cold War was at the root of his 
concern about the nation's economic health. The nation 
could only combat communism if it were economically 
healthy.73
As president, Eisenhower was as convinced in 1953 as he 
had been in the late 40s that the United States had to stand 
as the bulwark against Soviet expansionism and the 
establishment of new Soviet regimes. During his years with 
NATO he had refined his commitment to the fundamentals of 
containment, adding to his geopolitical analysis a new 
emphasis on the United States' need for trading partners.
The United States' economy could not succeed if it became 
isolated from the foreign markets and raw materials it 
required overseas.74 These questions of economic health
72Iwan W. Morgan, "Eisenhower and the Balanced Budget," 
in Warshaw, Reexamining the Eisenhower Presidency. 121-122.
73Ibid., 123.
74Louis Galambos, "Forward" in Warshaw, Reexamining the 
Eisenhower Presidency, viii.
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were always interwoven closely with the central elements of 
United States foreign policy.75
Eisenhower had little training in domestic affairs, but 
he possessed a broad background in international matters. 
World War II served as his point of reference in world 
affairs. He derived his rejection of postwar isolationism 
and appeasement from his experience during the war. His 
basic principles for conducting United States' foreign 
policy grew out of his wartime experience: the United States 
must make no major move without the support of key allies, 
and the President must undertake no major initiative 
overseas without the explicit support of Congress.76
Eisenhower's self-portrait, Crusade in Europe (1948), 
opened with the theme of cooperation which would run through 
the entire work and which would characterize his 
administration. This theme would be linked with related 
terms such as unity, teamwork, allies, and partnership. The 
picture which emerged was that of a leader who believed that 
the greatest safety lay in numbers and the soundest wisdom 
in a variety of voices.77 In Eisenhower's view the very 
reason for being a military officer was to preserve, protect 
and defend the United States and its values. For him the
75Ibid., x.
76Anthony James Joes, "Eisenhower Revisionism: The Tide 
Comes In." Presidential Studies Quarterly. 15 (Summer 1985): 
567.
77Medhurst, DDE: Strategic Communicator. 13.
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defense of his country assumed an almost religious nature.
In his moral scheme, the ends counted; words and actions 
were means only. He would take any measure to defeat the 
enemy or to protect his country.78 These sentiments would 
be visible in his foreign policy and in the activities of 
his administration, particularly in his use of the Central 
Intelligence Agency.
Eisenhower spoke about peace, promoted it and believed 
in peaceful co-existence with adversaries, but he saw peace 
as a direct result of military, economic, and spiritual 
strength. Military strength preserved democracy; economic 
strength preserved free trade and its open markets; 
spiritual strength preserved freedom of belief and 
worship.79 He was constantly aware of the link between 
political and economic vitality and the costs of military 
commitments overseas and the expense of maintaining a large 
peacetime military establishment.80
The newly elected president considered himself an 
expert in national security affairs and brought definite 
ideas on the management of national security to his 
presidency, chief of which was the necessity of aligning the 
defense budget to the well-being of the country's economy.
To this end he intended to limit defense spending based on a
78Ibid.
79Ibid., 86.
"Davis, Soldier of Democracy. 204.
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realistic appraisal of the cost of maintaining an adequate, 
but not extravagant national defense over an extended period 
of time. Eisenhower developed this "new look" at security 
policy in order to construct a viable alternative strategy 
to what he saw as Truman1s too costly method of implementing 
the national policy of containment.61
One of Eisenhower's first steps in this "new look" was 
to reorganize the presidency based on his experiences as a 
military planner and organizer. For years he had been in 
contact with the White House and had certain ideas about the 
"system, or lack or system, under which it operated." He 
was almost affronted by its lack of organization. "With my 
training in problems involving organization, it was 
inconceivable that the work of the White House could not be 
better systemized [sic]." Eisenhower worked through three 
principal agencies: the Cabinet, the National Security 
Council, and the Office of Budget. While he used these 
agencies to plan and execute his policies, he retained 
ultimate responsibility and remained fully in charge.82 
His acceptance of this principle harkens back to when he was
81Cole Christian Kingseed, "Eisenhower and Suez: A 
Reappraisal of Presidential Activism and Crisis Management" 
(Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1983), 13.
82Kingseed, "Eisenhower and Suez," 589.
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prepared to bear full responsibility if the D-Day landings 
in Europe had failed.83
Eisenhower was in broad agreement with the policy of 
containment, but not at the expense of the economic health 
of the United States. If the United States spent itself 
into insolvency, the Soviets would win the war without 
firing a shot. Eisenhower, as president, could have 
concluded that the United States could not afford the forces 
and the commitments for which Eisenhower, the Supreme 
Commander, had been partly responsible. Nuclear weapons 
saved Eisenhower from such a choice.84
After a visit to the Sixth Fleet in 1951, General 
Eisenhower had called for a reexamination of United States' 
defense and foreign policy. President Eisenhower thought 
that the militarization of containment and the vast 
expansion of America's military might called for by NSC 68 
carried with it the seeds of a great irony - the United 
States could lose the Cold war by becoming too heavily 
armed.85
Prior to his election, Eisenhower had spoken of the 
importance of preserving the economic solvency of the United
83R. Gordon Hoxie, "Eisenhower and Presidential 
Leadership," Presidential Studies Quarterly. 13 (Fall 1983): 
589.
84Kaplan, American Historians and the Atlantic 
Alliance. 65.
85Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary, 18 October 1951, DDEL.
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States based on convictions that went back to his assignment 
as Army Chief of Staff and Supreme Allied Commander. During 
a meeting with Senator Robert A. Taft following his 
nomination, Eisenhower agreed with Taft that overall 
government spending, including defense spending, could be 
drastically reduced.86 Eisenhower repeated this theme 
throughout the campaign, stressing that the largest savings 
in government expenditures could be made in the defense 
budget, but without any reduction in national security.87
In 1953 Eisenhower took office deeply convinced that 
the United States needed a national strategy for the Cold 
War, a strategy which would require the selection of broad 
national purposes to bring all the agencies of the 
government under the control of a single national strategy. 
Under Eisenhower the National Security Council became the 
principal vehicle for formulating and promulgating this 
strategy.88
The national defense policy the Eisenhower 
Administration inherited from the Truman Administration came 
in the form of NSC 68 and the budget for Fiscal Year 1954.
86New York Times. September 13, 1952.
87Glenn H. Snyder, "The "New Look" of 1953," in 
Strategy. Politics, and Defense Budgets. Warner R.
Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond and Glenn H. Snyder, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1962), 389.
88Keith C. Clark and Laurence J. Legere, eds., The 
President and the Management of National Security (New York, 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), 60.
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Eisenhower was thus presented with what he called "the great
question," that is, how to maintain an adequate defense
policy, meet domestic requirements, and still obtain the
budgetary and tax reductions inherent in Republican views on
managing the economy. Eisenhower determined that he would
plan for the "long haul" rather than the year of maximum
danger espoused by Truman’s planners in NSC 68.89 As he
said in his first inaugural address, he saw a sustained and
uncompromising conflict ahead with the Soviets.
We must be ready to dare all for our country for history 
does not long entrust the care of freedom to the weak or 
timid. We must acquire proficiency in defense and 
display stamina in purpose.90
Eisenhower's criticism of NSC 68 was that it ignored 
the connection between national security and fiscal 
responsibility. His April 1953 cut in military 
appropriations was a gesture aimed at pacifying Senator 
Taft, but real reductions demanded new concepts to replace 
those inherited from the Truman Administration. The Truman 
Administration had aimed its planning at a selected year of 
crisis - 1954 when it was said that the Soviet Union would 
be capable of and most likely to attack the West. This 
concept would result in a stockpile of weapons that would 
quickly become obsolete. The Eisenhower Administration's
89Kinnard, Eisenhower and Strategy Management. 8.
90U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of 
the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal 
Register. National Archives and records Service, 1958), 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958, 7.
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policy, the "New Look,” called instead for the development 
and maintenance of a strong military posture emphasizing the 
capability of "inflicting massive retaliatory damage" by 
offensive weapons and the need for a "sound, strong and 
growing economy."91
Harkening back to his military organizational 
experience, Eisenhower used a collegial approach to 
examining defense doctrine. In June 1953 he directed that 
three teams of experts investigate the three alternatives of 
foreign policy open to the administration. George Kennan, 
the former Director of the State Department Policy Planning 
Staff, led the first group, Task Force A, while Major 
General James McCormack, U.S. Air Force, led Task Force B. 
General McCormack was a military and political planner as 
well as an atomic weapons expert. Admiral Richard Conolly, 
President of the Naval War College, led the final group,
Task Force C. The Directing Panel of Project Solarium 
required each group to write a strategy directive that 
reflected the administration's perceptions about the range 
of capabilities and actions that the Soviet Union might take 
in the years ahead.92
Kennan's group studied a continuation of the policy of 
containment as inherited from the Truman Administration 
which assumed that the Soviet Union posed a long-term
91FRUS, 1952-54 2:577-597
92Ibid., 392
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political, economic, and ideological threat to the United 
States. McCormack's group assumed that the Soviets were 
militarily aggressive, but still cautious and unwilling to 
risk a general war or move against interests protected by a 
resolute United States which would use nuclear weapons to 
punish Soviet aggression. The last group, led by Conolly, 
assumed that the Soviet Union wanted to expand its territory 
and influence, and that it was increasing its military 
strength and political activity to that end. The Lymnitzer 
group examined the substitution of a policy of liberation 
for that of containment to roll back Communist borders.93
On 16 July 1953 the Project Solarium Task Forces 
presented their alternative basic national security 
policies. President Eisenhower spoke at length after the 
presentations and offered a synthesis of the three views.94 
While George Kennan had most heavily influenced the 
conclusions and recommendations that came out of the 
Solarium Project and foresaw a long-term rather than a 
short-term threat and a political rather than a military 
threat, Eisenhower proposed an essentially military strategy 
for the "long haul," but one which would remove the urgency 
behind defense appropriations and enable his administration
93Synder et al, Strategy. Politics, and Defense 
Budgets. 408.
94FRUS. 1954-1954 2:397.
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to spread out expenses.95 Once again Eisenhower had found 
the middle road which would enable him to continue to oppose 
the Communists yet at the same time to preserve the United 
States' democratic institutions and way of life.
Approved on 30 October 1953, the NSC 162 series of 
National Security Council papers spelled out the strategy 
behind the "New Look." The armed forces could count on 
using nuclear weapons when required. Force levels were to 
be planned on the fundamental national security objective of 
deterring Soviet aggression, primarily by means of massive 
nuclear retaliation. Greater reliance would be placed on 
indigenous forces to counter local aggressions. As these 
local forces were built up, American ground forces would 
eventually be reduced. The United States would participate 
in local actions mainly through tactical sea and air power 
and quickly deployable mobile ground units, presumably using 
tactical nuclear weapons.96
NSC 162 determined that the Soviet threat as a total 
threat would continue indefinitely. The Soviets currently 
had the capacity to make an effective nuclear attack on the 
United States, but did not seem likely to launch an attack 
through mid-1955. The security of the United States 
required the "development and maintenance of a strong
95William B. Pickett, "The Eisenhower Solarium Notes," 
The Society for Historians of Foreign Relations Newsletter 
16 (June 1985): 4.
96Capitanchik, The Eisenhower Presidency. 42.
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military posture . . . and the maintenance of a sound, 
strong and growing economy."97
Other provisions of NSC 162 called for the maintenance
of an atomic capability to counterbalance Soviet atomic
power, the support of overseas bases and allies, and the
maintenance of a sound economy as a basis for high defense
productivity and free institutions. In the face of the
Soviet military threat and the economic threat of a
continued build-up as in NSC 68,
the United States must develop and maintain, at the 
lowest feasible cost, requisite military and nonmilitary 
strength to deter and, if necessary, to counter Soviet 
military aggression against the United States or other 
areas vital to its security.98
Eisenhower's strategic concept can be summarized as an 
increased reliance on nuclear deterrence and a rejection of 
preventive war. He stressed the new technology of nuclear 
weapons and placed heavy reliance on the use of allied land 
forces around the Soviet periphery. Economic strength was 
to be achieved through reduced defense budgets. The United 
States and the Free World had to be prepared to continue the 
struggle with communism over the coming decades.99
Eisenhower, consistent with his own philosophy of 
fiscal conservatism, imposed new budget restraints on 
defense spending and looked to nuclear weapons to fill the
97FRUS. 1952-1954 2:582.
"Ibid., 591.
"Kinnard, Eisenhower and Strategy Management. 10.
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gap. Eisenhower saw a strong national defense and a strong 
economy as the twin pillars of national security, but he 
faulted Truman for allowing the rapid pace of the buildup to 
jeopardize the economy.
Eisenhower established the basic outlines of his 
administration's national security policy during the second 
half of 1953. The New Look came to embody a new grand 
strategy of diplomatic, military, and economic doctrines and 
concepts. It governed the mobilization, deployment and use 
of force as both a deterrent and a defense; it also included 
a set of changes in the military establishment aimed at 
striking a balance between national security and economic 
welfare.100 Eisenhower used his experience in handling 
large bureaucracies and his great rapport with the American 
people to sell his new and more economical strategy to the 
Allies and to his countrymen.101
The military application of the New Look was the 
doctrine of massive retaliation which emphasized deterrence 
through the threat of nuclear punishment at a time and place 
of the United States' choosing. This restored the 
initiative to the United States rather than having it only 
respond to the moves or intent of the Soviets. The reliance 
on nuclear weapons also allowed a reduction in military
100Synder et al, Strategy. Politics, and Defense 
Budgets, 383.
101Kinnard, Eisenhower and Strategy Management. 14.
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manpower, thus achieving a reduction in overall defense 
costs.102 Eisenhower, when institutionalizing the New Look, 
avoided exacerbating interservice military rivalries by 
reallocating resources among the five categories of forces 
and by placing greater emphasis than formerly on the 
deterrent and destructive power of improved nuclear weapons, 
better means of delivery, and more effective air defense 
capability.103
Although the New Look can also be seen as the "middle 
way" between an all-nuclear strategy on the one hand and a 
strategy based solely on conventional forces on the other, 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles portrayed it 
differently. In a speech to the Council on Foreign 
Relations on 12 January 1954 entitled "Collective Security," 
Dulles spoke of the quest for a maximum deterrent at a 
bearable cost. Local defenses must be reinforced by the 
further deterrent of massive retaliatory power. The way for 
a free community to deter aggression was to be willing and 
able to respond vigorously and at places and with means of 
its own choosing. The basic decision was made to depend 
primarily on a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by 
means and at places of our choosing.104 Eisenhower himself
102Synder et al, Strategy. Politics, and Defense 
Budgets, 384-5.
103Kingseed, "Eisenhower and Suez," 13.
104Kinnard, Eisenhower and Strategy Management. 26.
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approved Dulles' draft of the speech after making a few 
crucial modifications to the remarks. Eisenhower, ever the 
political animal, must have allowed Dulles to enunciate the 
new policy in order to maintain his own freedom of movement 
as well as to convince critics that defense cuts resulting 
from the new policy did not lessen overall strength or 
indicate a faltering resolve.
The New Look amounted to a gamble that the 
Administration could deter the Soviets through the threat of 
nuclear retaliation. This gamble would save defense costs 
and keep the economy strong if it succeeded. If it failed, 
civilization might be trampled by the Soviets in their rush 
to take over the West. Ike, who relished the game of 
bridge, held a nuclear trump card which he hoped never to 
have to play.105
105Robert L. Ivie, "Eisenhower as Cold Warrior," in 
Eisenhower's War of Words ed. Martin J. Medhurst, (East 
Lansing MI: Michigan State University, 1994), 9.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION
Both postwar presidents dealt with the foreign policy 
and national security issues that faced them from the depths 
of their prepresidential experiences and worldviews. One 
president launched the United States on a course of 
confrontation with a hostile power. The other president 
applied a correction to that course that aimed the United 
States in the direction of eventual victory. The 
backgrounds and worldviews of both presidents significantly 
influenced the lives of their countrymen and the outcome of 
the Cold War with the Soviet Union.
Harry Truman became president at a time of great flux 
in the United States as it emerged from the longest war of 
its history. As the principal power in the West, the United 
States came to oppose an aggressive Eurasian power which it 
saw as determined to dominate the world. Through the Truman 
Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, Harry Truman, an 
acknowledged neophyte in foreign affairs, placed the United 
States directly in the path of the Soviet Union.
Harry Truman was a professional politician, but a man 
who believed in himself, kept his word, and expected others 
to do the same. Relying upon a sense and an understanding
139
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of history as a guide to action, Truman brought a plain- 
spoken, common sense approach to foreign affairs. Arriving 
at a critical intersection of historical courses, President 
Truman brought the clear-sighted, black-and-white view of 
Middle America to bear upon international problems. If 
there were a threat, then all measures possible must be 
taken to counter that threat. History taught that half­
hearted measures led to future problems.
In 1953 the country acquired another president, but one 
who considered himself an expert in national security 
affairs. Operating from a deeper base of experience and 
more secure sense of himself, Eisenhower brought definite 
ideas on the management of national security to the 
presidency, chief of which was the necessity of aligning the 
defense budget to the well-being of the country's economy.
To this end he limited defense spending and re-oriented 
national security policy. From his desire to make a 
realistic appraisal of what the maintenance of an adequate, 
but not extravagant national defense would cost over an 
extended period of time, Eisenhower developed a "new look" 
security policy aimed at constructing a viable national 
strategy.1
The intent of this national security and foreign policy 
initiative was to maintain a military establishment at a 
more or less steady level, regardless of short-term changes
^ingseed, "Eisenhower and Suez," 13.
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in Soviet intentions and capabilities. This was a change 
from the previous policy which responded to Communist 
initiatives rather than basing its actions on a long-range 
plan. Reduced defense budgets enabled President Eisenhower 
to live up to his campaign promise of reductions in 
government spending as well as the reorientation of defense 
and foreign policy for the long haul. This set the United 
States on a foreign policy course maintained by succeeding 
presidents - a course which eventually parted the Iron 
Curtain and broke up the Soviet Union, though not without 
exceeding the costs deemed prudent by Eisenhower. The Long 
Telegram had indeed grown into a New Look at foreign policy.
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